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For O. Blyne

CURIOS QUESTIONS.

BY

REV. HENRY A. BRANN, D.D.
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TO THE

VERY REV. T. J. O'MAHONY, D.D., D.C.L.,

AS A

PLEDGE OF FRIENDSHIP

WHICH TIME OR DISTANCE CAN NOT CHANGE,

This Book is Dedicated.



P R E F A C E .

THIS book has been written with the hope of doing some good. The author, in reading the works of American writers, has observed that their errors arise from a lack of first principles, from a defect in their primary education. Those who read the following questions will find that, for the most part, they treat of all that is most difficult and at the same time most essential in human knowledge. When the first principles are correct, errors are rare. Logic, and natural humility, which consists in the consciousness of the mind's weakness, render man infallible.

The book might be longer and better. It will be longer if it meet with an appreciation sufficient to encourage the author. Abler and more experienced pens must make it better. There are many who have the ability to aid our literature;

yet indolence or excess of modesty restrains their pen. They forget that, although it is better to write no book than a bad one, it is better to have a book of mediocrity, to supply a want or help a cause, than none at all. We must all work; we must all strive to fulfill our mission in the plan of creation. Hence, if we can write a book that may do good, natural or supernatural, we should not hesitate even though the purity of our motives should be suspected.

The author wishes to say but one word in conclusion, to propitiate the critics. No one will be more delighted than he to find that his critic has written a better book than this. The author wishes to evoke the thoughts of others as well as express his own. In the friction of minds there must be scintillations of light, and intellectual light is truth.

FORT LEE, August 15, 1866.

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CURIOS QUESTIONS.

INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER I.

THE UTILITY OF PHILOSOPHY.

WE live in a most unphilosophical age: principles are despised, and iniquity respected. In religion, in government, in the family circle, all is confusion. Sects swarm, and tear Christianity into bits like ants with a crumb; some of them destroy not only revealed religion, but reject even the law of nature. Political heresies brood among the nations. Robbery is applauded on the ground of expediency; rebellion is justified in the press, and shows itself boldly on the field of battle; plots for

the overthrow of established thrones, round which grow the moss of centuries, are hatched in the countless secret societies of Europe and America. The family tie has been broken by the civil laws in admitting divorce; the state in this case showing the corruption of the citizens, for the state is sound so long as its members are incorrupt. Children, in consequence of social vices, have been dragged from their mothers' arms, and allowed to grow up ignorant of true principles; their minds warped from their natural bent to goodness by the example of fathers without religion, or mothers without virtue. The age is illogical; unreasonable in its institutions, for it eschews religion in its education, allows the extreme of tyranny and licentiousness in its civil governments, and consequently, partially if not completely ignores the immutable principles of the natural law. Such a diseased state of human society cries out for a remedy. Religion is that remedy, and after religion

sound philosophy. We say sound philosophy, for the aberrations of the Germans of modern times have done harm instead of good. The philosophy of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, imported into France by Victor Cousin and Ernest Renan, and sown broadcast in Italy by the pantheists, has been wafted on the wings of the winds to our own land. It has taken root, and its fruits are an unprincipled press, fanaticism, and general unbelief. The Christian philosopher must try to do his part in healing these eye-sores of modern times. It is a duty he owes to his God and to his fellow-beings; he is bound to be an active member of society, influencing its thought; not a mere passive spectator of the scenes enacted on the world's theatre. Hence, he must study sound philosophy, and hence one of the great advantages of intellectual philosophy, so often sneered at and so much neglected in our schools.

It is our intention, in this preliminary chapter, to expose the utility of this sci-

ence, that the reader may be induced the more zealously to apply himself to the acquiring of a perfect mastery of it. In order, therefore, that we may proceed with greater clearness, we shall divide our remarks into three parts. In the first we shall speak of the utility of this study considered with regard to the subject-matter of which it treats. In the second we shall discourse of its importance, subjectively considered, as a means of mental culture; and in the third we shall glance at it as relating to revealed religion and smoothing the way to theology, being in this respect the footstool of faith and the handmaid of religion.

Sec. 1. The utility of Philosophy shown from the nature of the matter of which it treats.

What is the object of philosophical research? It is God, the world, and man. There is a great part of this science that

treats of the existence, nature, and attributes of the Divinity. The whole of Theodicy has no other scope than to prove the existence of God and explain his attributes. Now, no one will deny the importance of this part of intellectual philosophy; for what is of more importance than the knowledge of God? God is the Being of beings, the Creator of all things, and man's final cause. To know such a being is important to man. He was made for no other being but God, he tends to God as to his centre. God is the sun of his planetary system; hence the utility of studying a science that makes of God a special study; that investigates the nature of the Divinity, examines his infinite perfections, his goodness, omnipotence, and immensity. The advantages to be derived from such a study are manifest; for by knowing our Creator better we love him more, and are more inclined to aim at possessing Him. Now, the possession of the end for which we were formed

is that which is most important to us; therefore, the study of intellectual philosophy which helps us to arrive at the term of our existence is of the greatest importance to us. The second object of which our science treats is the universe. The world of possibilities, which is the world of ideas, cosmology describes and endeavors to explain. This world is the link that binds us and God together; for other beings have their proximate end in man, though their last end, like that of man himself, must be God. To know the means of arriving at our end, to know the reason of the existence of other beings around us, is of great utility and advantage to us. We must always in these matters go on the hypothesis that nothing is useful or advantageous to man which does not tend either mediately or immediately to the end for which he was created. For what is meant by the word useful, if not apt for a purpose? Usefulness, then, supposes a purpose—an end in the acquisi-

tion of which useful things are employed. Hence, to man nothing is useful but what leads to his final end, to which all other ends are subservient, and compared with which they are secondary. Now creatures are made to serve man, to aid him in knowing his Creator. St. Augustine, a great philosopher, says that moral deformity consists in endeavoring to enjoy what is only meant to be used, "frui utendis et uti fruendis." When we know creatures and their causes we know the greatness of their Creator, as well as their own littleness better. Besides this there is a great benefit derived from the knowledge of creatures; we know their exact worth; they can not, therefore, cheat us; and this, certainly, is a very useful knowledge. The poet has said, "Felix qui potest rerum cognoscere causas," and he said truly; for, besides the incontestable pleasure derived from such examinations in the satisfaction of our intellectual curiosity, the utility also is very great, as we

have shown; great because of the character of means which the universe bears in our relation to God; great, also, on account of the subjective improvement of our intellectual capacities. And here we touch on the third great utility of philosophy, considered in relation to the objects of which it treats. There is a very extensive part of our science which treats of the soul and its faculties, and, taken even in its more general sense, which treats of man's body also. Logic and psychology in a special manner deal with human thought, and the different operations of the mind. The old philosophers said that science consisted in the *γνωθε θεον καὶ σεαυτον*, "the knowledge of God and of ourselves." Now, both these parts of science are embraced by philosophy. Self-knowledge is very important for all. It is useful to know our failings and our strength, so that we may not be tempted to go beyond it. Now, to know our strength, we study in philosophy the character of our

mental faculties, and their ways of working; the mechanism of the mind, and the play of the passions. Psychology and logic are mental anatomy. We fathom the depth of our intellect, and learn to distrust its shallows and quicksands; we feel the pulse of the will, to learn whether it be feverish and wayward, or firm and resolute. We drag our imagination to the bar of reason and interrogate it as to its intentions, so that it may not hurriedly lead us astray before reflection has time to recall it to the right path. Man's mind is a kingdom which philosophy examines, classifying its products, arranging in order its powers, as a geologist places fossils in a cabinet. Knowledge is power; and hence the knowledge we acquire of ourselves by the philosophical examination of the faculties of the soul gives us a better appreciation of our own ability. In a word, if we reflect for a moment on the character of the objects with which philosophy deals, taking reason as the

judge, we shall charge strongly for the utility of the science. Nor will the result be otherwise if we examine the question of the utility of philosophy from the subjective point of view.

Sec. 2. The importance of the study of Intellectual Philosophy as a means of intellectual culture.

Those who are best able to judge of the utility of our science place it the last in the course of classical education. The reason is obvious, because it is the crowning science of all—it caps the climax of elementary education. It is the *scientia scientiarum*, the basis of all, and it runs through all, for it is the science of reason, and reason is necessary everywhere. The boy, after having gone through his classics and the greater part of his mathematical studies, is gradually being transformed into a man. He now needs a greater aid in controlling his passions than heretofore. Though grace is more than

sufficient, still he must not disdain to use her handmaid, Nature. Hence, the science of reason as well as of faith is imparted to him, till his mind becomes inoculated with right principles. The play of his fancy is checked, the waywardness of his will controlled, and the reluctance of his intellect to meditate overcome by constant application to the study of matter, which brings out all the reflective powers. His mind is drilled by syllogisms daily; he argues; he proposes his thesis, lays down his premises, and draws his conclusions according to rule, as an architect builds a mansion. He had been accustomed to think as the ostrich flies, by fits and starts; now his reasoning is close, connected, solid. Heretofore there was an exaggerated growth of the imagination apparent in his style; weeds grew along with flowers; now his judgment assumes the office of *pruner*. The style becomes chaster and more elegant. He has passed from being an author of bom-

bastic verses to being the writer of sound prose; and if he still preserves the character of a poet, his productions are more labored and exact.

There is more common-sense appearing in him as his reason improves under logical discipline and metaphysical drill. He obeys more readily, for the principles he is imbibing influence his will. Exceptions there may be to this rule, but the exceptions prove the rule here as well as in many other cases.

In fact, the improvement of his intellect, will, and imagination is apparent. His intellect grows robust, it seizes great difficulties by the hair, it dives into abysses, scales precipices, it has the *δοσ πον στῶ* of Archimedes, nothing can shake it, and it can move the world. The intellect becomes more impartial, it examines both sides of questions, acquires a love of justice, stability, and strength, and loves to see them everywhere, in religion as well as in government. The thoughts be-

come clear—for philosophy is an intellectual clarifier—the conceptions exact, and the expression of the thought more just, according to the rule of Boileau: “*Ce qui se conçoit bien s'énonce clairement.*” Clearness of expression is a consequence of clearness of thought. On the will, it (our science) produces similar effects, for volition generally follows the intellect. Mental conviction is the next step to persuasion. The young man’s ardor is not quenched by our science, but tempered. We had seen more of the animal in the boy and child; philosophy brings out the rational, so that we finally have the definition of the metaphysicians proved: “*Homo est animal rationale.*” The effect of serious study on a wild imagination is evident from experience. Young men, whose passions were mad as Charybdis, whose fancy never dismounted Pegasus, and never let the winged charger relax from a breakneck gallop, have gradually become tamed under the influence of

philosophy. The boiling of the Charybdis of the classics has ended in a quiet simmer ; and the furious Pegasus has taken to a quiet and steady walk. We have seen it, and others more competent to judge bear testimony to this good result obtained from the study of intellectual philosophy. It is so useful, too, at a time when young men are going to decide the all-important question of vocation, to have their minds rendered capable of serious reflection, that the choice may be made with prudence and calmness. In fact, philosophy is useful to the statesman ; for how can he decide on questions of civil policy without knowing the principles of the natural law and law of nations ? It is useful to the lawyer for the same reasons, but it has a special usefulness for him besides. He is a pleader ; he must know how to refute his adversary's arguments, as well as to prove his own case ; he needs logic. To be able to form a judgment on the character of

the witnesses, he must have studied the workings of the minds of men. Even if he be a physician, the knowledge of the connection between the body and soul will help him immensely in the curing of sick imaginations as well as corporal infirmities. But if he be a Christian minister, the utility of this science is incontestably suitable to his character and to the nature of the sciences to which he must apply his mind in the holy ministry.

This, however, brings us to the third great utility of intellectual philosophy as it appears from its connection with the supernatural order of things.

Sec. 3. The utility of the study of Intellectual Philosophy as the handmaid of Religion.

There is a philosophy of religion as well as of history; there is philosophy in every science. No science seems to be more closely joined to intellectual philosophy than theology.

Theology treats of revealed, philosophy of natural religion; but the latter is the footstool of the former, for grace builds on nature. It might be said with truth, that theology is not specifically distinct, but only a degree higher up the scale than philosophy; it gives us a better knowledge of God than philosophy. In the latter science we see him faintly, as the sun in a cloudy sky; in the former, though not visible as in noon-day brightness, still we behold him more clearly. Reason points him out in the one, faith in the other. In philosophy, we argue from first principles, given by intuition or discovered by the mere workings of intellectual power; in theology, we build our science on facts which we have learned by revelation, and by uniting these facts together we have the principles of a science.

Theology treats of God, of the soul, and of creatures considered in a supernatural light; and as philosophy treats of

them in a natural point of view, it follows that the philosophical knowledge we acquire of them serves us greatly in rising to the higher sphere. There is, as it were, an echo of the supernatural in the natural order. Revelation's shadow falls into the natural order. In fact the two orders are inseparable and dovetailed into each other, if we may so speak, in time as well as in eternity.

It was the observation of this fact that made Gioberti invent the mental faculty which he calls *sovrintelligenza*, or superintelligence—the natural power of apprehending in the supernatural order. We say which made him invent the faculty, for its existence is problematic. It was this connection between theology and philosophy that made the scholastics give the latter science the name of “*Ancilla Theologiae*.” In modern times this name has been rejected by many philosophers, who could not bear to hear their favorite science receive a name that would

imply inferiority. This feeling, however, is one of unreasonable pride, for there is no insult meant to philosophy by giving her her natural position. She is a hand-maid, and though rationalists may endeavor to put reason above faith, they will never succeed in their undertaking, for things must be as God wills them. At the same time, therefore, that we give our science all the honor that is due to her, we must never exaggerate her worth.

Men have done so in our days, and their conduct has been the cause of the general fear that has crept into some minds of philosophy and every thing that sounds like it. They look on a philosopher as a bugbear, a humbug, or a madman. He is supposed to be a human being who deals only with ethereal objects, and can not descend from his elevated position to the ordinary mundane sphere. This, in fact, is one of the great objections against the study of philosophy; we shall answer it, therefore, before

we end this chapter. Does philosophy make men unreal and exaggerated? We have shown its utility from the nature of the matter of which it treats, as well as from its great power in cultivating the mind. We should not, therefore, be induced to consider it a dangerous study on account of the abuse which some have made of it. There is no contesting the fact that all the dangerous systems of modern times have had founders who prided themselves on being philosophers. Communism in France, claims St. Simon and Pierre Le Roux as its authors; the Pantheists, in Germany, glory in Hegel, Fichte, and Schelling. We need not mention some of our own philosophical scapegoats, whose exaggerations are as great as any of the worst European speculations. The abuse never destroys the thing used. The Bible is abused, yet the Bible is the best of books; and though food is abused by those who eat to excess, it does not there-

fore follow that we are to die of hunger. So is it with philosophy; we do not praise bad philosophy, but sound philosophy. We speak of the advantages of sound philosophy, not of the creations of bewildered brains. There are objections against every thing that is good. It is not, therefore, astonishing that there should be objections against philosophy. But, after all, those who know the science, feel that there is none more useful or more important; none more beloved of reason and more respected by faith. Let us, therefore, proceed to examine some of the most interesting questions which the science proposes to be solved by the human intellect.

CHAPTER II.

PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS.

Section 1.—Logical Terms.

AN artist should know the names and uses of his instruments before undertaking to use them. We shall therefore explain some of the terms used in logic, in psychology, and in ontology, before examining some of the most interesting questions of philosophy. The first simple act of the mind is perception or apprehension, and the object of this act is an idea. An idea is every object apprehended by the mind, or it is the object of thought. We call the first operation of the mind an act, though Gioberti holds the mind to be passive in the first gleam of thought, which he calls

intuition. In his system, intuition is the presentation of the object to the mind.

When the mind has apprehended an idea, it may compare it with another idea, and thus judge. Judgment is therefore the second act of the mind, and consists in the affirmation or negation of an agreement between two ideas. The elements of a judgment are, therefore, two ideas, and a copula or connecting link between them. The oral expression of a judgment is called a proposition. The first term of a proposition is called the subject, which is affirmed or denied of a second idea, which is called the predicate. The next operation of the mind consists in comparing different judgments with each other, and this is done by reasoning or argumentation. The simplest mode of argumentation, and the one to which all species of argument may be reduced, is the syllogism. A syllogism or argument is the act of the mind by which we reduce one proposition from two others.

The elements of a syllogism are therefore three—the two extremes and the middle term. In every syllogism we compare two terms or ideas with a third, either pronouncing that they agree with this third and hence agree with each other, or that they disagree with the third and hence disagree with each other. The two terms compared are the two extremes; one of them is called the minor extreme, and it is the subject of the conclusion. The middle term—the term of comparison—must never be found in the conclusion. Another term explained in logic is that of certitude.

Certitude is said to exist when a judgment has an essential connection with truth. Certitude has three branches—evidence, common-sense, and authority. Judgments certain by evidence are those which are certain in the very act of thought. Judgments certain by common-sense are those which derive their certainty from the infallible voice of nature.

Judgments certain by authority are those which are derived from the testimony of a rational being, which we admit as a rule of truth.

Demonstration, another logical term, consists in showing that a given proposition is certain by some one of these three kinds of certitude.

PSYCHOLOGICAL TERMS.

Psychology is that part of philosophy which treats of the soul. The soul is conceived by us as the subject of thought, or as that substance whose specific termination is thought. We are conscious of thought by that internal monitor called conscience or internal sense, which tells us of our soul and its modifications. There are three elements in thought. The first is the representation of some object distinct from the soul and constituting the object of thought. This object considered in itself is called being. But considered as illuminating the mind, it

is called idea. The operation of the mind in apprehending this object is called perception. When the soul perceives it acts, and by this exercise of its activity, it, as it were, creates its own thoughts. The principal exercise of the activity of the soul is in judgment; that is to say, the mental affirmation by which the mind pronounces such or such a notion to be included or not included in such or such another notion. The various sensations, namely, of color, sound, etc., etc., which affect the mind when it perceives and acts, constitute the third element of thought. This element produces speech. It is the sensible element of thought. Speech serves as the sensible exponent of the mind's ideas. It is, as it were, the mirror in which ideas are represented. Hence the three elements of thought are perception, activity, and sensibility, if we look at thought from a psychological stand-point; if we look at it, though, objectively, its elements are object, copula,

and subject. The old division of the faculties was into intellect, will, and memory; but as we know sufficiently well the meaning of those faculties, we will not dwell upon them, but pass immediately to some of the ontological terms.

ONTOLOGICAL TERMS.

We often see the term being employed. We mean by being reality; every reality that is the object of thought is being. There are, however, different classes of being, and there are certain conceptions subordinate to the general notion of being, namely, essence and existence. The essence of a thing is that which makes a being what it is; or to use a scholastic term, *essence* is the *quiddity* of a thing. The elements of an essence are several, which are called its modes or properties. Some are so peculiar to an essence that they distinguish it from every thing else. These are called specific properties, and

distinguish the different species of being. Other modes are common to several essences, and by these, species are distinguished into kinds or genera. That kind which has none above it is called being in general. In speaking of any essence, we must distinguish the extension from its comprehension. The comprehension of an essence is given in its definition, in which we have an enumeration of its specific properties. The extension is given by a division, where we have the enumeration either of the different species or of the different *individuals* in a species. From essence we pass to *existence*. This term expresses the actuation of the essence. In the idea of essence is included the possibility of the creation of an indefinite number of individuals bearing its stamp. This is true of all essences except the essence of God. But in the idea of existence you have the notion of but one individual. In this individual you distinguish two elements, 1st. The

substance, which is the fundamental support of every thing that happens in the existing being, and hence it may be called being subsisting in itself, or better, an active force, as Leibnitz defines it. The other element is the *mode*, and it varies. Modes are the different ways in which different substances exist. Every *essence* is immutable and necessary; but not so with every *existence*. Some are merely contingent. God alone exists immutably. As contingent existences have not the principle of actuation in themselves, they suppose it to rest in some other being, which is their *cause* and whose effects they are. A *cause*, therefore, is whatever exists perfectly in itself, and gives the beginning of existence to another. Its production is called the *effect*.

QUESTION FIRST.

WHAT IS SCIENCE?

JUDGMENTS are of two kinds—certain and doubtful. Judgments are certain when there is an essential connection between the object apprehended and the subject apprehending. Judgments are only probable when this essential connection between the object and the subject does not exist. *Scientific knowledge* is a series of certain judgments, all derived from one common principle. The links of the series are called common principles. There may be different classes of common principles, and different series of certain judgments, hence there may be different kinds of *scientific knowledge*. A series of cer-

tain judgments, joined together by common principles and constituting one class, is called a science.

Science and art are not synonymous, either in sound or sense. Art is the assemblage of the rules by which human activity is directed in the attainment of any end ; for instance, the rules necessary to the painter, in order that he may exercise his profession, constitute the *art of painting*. In a subjective sense, however, *art* is often used synonymously with *skill*. Still, mere manual skill is not art. Science has very little direct relation with manual exercise, while art is seldom or never without this relation.

All philosophers agree that science should be divided into different branches. They often agree upon the names even to be given to those classes, but there is very little agreement about the reason of the *division of science*. The ancient philosophers divided science into *speculative* and *practical*, and an intermediate science,

which they called *instrumental*. This division is commonly attributed to Aristotle, though Brucker says that Plato is the author of it. Instrumental science is called *logic*, which teaches the rules of reasoning. *Speculative* science goes no farther than the knowledge of the object, while *practical* science endeavors to reduce speculative knowledge to practice. The speculative sciences are physics, metaphysics, and mathematics. Physics treats of visible existences; metaphysics of invisible and immutable things, and comprises general *ontology* and *theodicy*; while the *mathematics* treat of divided and continued *quantity*. The practical sciences are *ethics*, *politics*, and *private economy*. The philosophers of the middle ages divided the sciences according to the three faculties of the universities, namely, *theology*, *law*, and *medicine*. The other sciences were called arts, and were divided into the *liberal* and the *mechanical*. The liberal arts were seven in num-

ber, and subdivided into two classes : the first called the *trivium*, which included *grammar*, *rhetoric*, and *dialectics* ; the second called the *quadrivium*, which comprised *music*, *geometry*, *astronomy*, and *arithmetic*. The *mechanical arts* were also seven in number, namely, *agriculture*, *hunting*, the *art of war*, *architecture*, *navigation*, *painting*, and *surgery*. In these categories neither *logic* nor *ethics* was mentioned, because up to the twelfth century these sciences were not taught under their present names. When Aristotle's philosophy was in fashion, they were numbered among the *arts*. The faculty of *arts* in modern universities has been subdivided into two others, namely, that of letters and that of *mathematics* and *physical sciences*, so that now universities have five faculties instead of three. Among the modern divisions of science, the first is that of *Bacon*. *Francis Bacon*, who lived in the seventeenth century, and published a work entitled

“*De Augmentis Scientiarum*,” gives the following division of science. He says that it may be classified according to the three faculties of the mind—memory, imagination, and understanding or reason. To memory belongs history, which is subdivided into civil and ecclesiastical. To the imagination must be referred poetry, which may be divided into narrative, dramatic, and parabolic. Finally, to reason belongs science, properly so-called, which is divided into philosophy and theology. Bacon divides philosophy into divine, natural, and human, while he leaves theology to be subdivided by the theologians. The authors of the great work published in France, in the eighteenth century, under the name of “*Encyclopædia*,” give almost the same division of science as that of Bacon. They divide it into history, philosophy, and poetry. They subdivide history into sacred, civil, and natural. Philosophy, according to these authors, comprises general metaphysics, natural

and revealed theology, the science of good and bad spirits, the science of man, which is subdivided into pneumatology and universal logic, and finally into moral science and the science of nature, which comprises the metaphysics of bodies; pure and applied mathematics, and special physics. Poetry is divided into sacred and profane, and each of these subdivided into narrative, dramatic, and parabolic. The next division of science is that of M. Ampère, a French writer of the present century. His division is very detailed. According to him, there are two primary kingdoms of science, which are subdivided into two more, and these two again into two others. The two latter are called two general series, and are subdivided into two sub-series, and each sub-series contains two sciences of the first order, and each science of the first order two sciences of the second order, and each of the second two of the third order. The sciences of the third order are one hun-

dred and twenty-eight in number. The two general kingdoms of science are cosmological and noölogical. The cosmological sciences are either cosmological, properly so called, or psychological. The cosmological are divided into mathematical and physical, and the psychological into natural and medicinal. The noölogical sciences are either noölogical, properly so-called, or social. The noölogical are divided into philosophical and dialegmatical. The social are divided into ethnological and political.

Of these four divisions of science, three follow reason; but all the authors of these three divisions differ in their manner of explaining them. Plato divides science according to the end which it has in view; Bacon, according to the faculty which is principally exercised in acquiring the science; while Ampère attends only to the object of which science treats. What are we, then, to think of these respective divisions? We reject the first

one, because it does not divide the sciences so as to distinguish one part from another. There is no practical science which is not in a certain sense speculative, and there is no speculative science which may not be made more or less practical. Hence the division of Aristotle must be rejected, for it does not distinguish the parts from each other; and this is necessary according to the rules of logic. Neither can we admit the division of Bacon; for although science bears a necessary relation to the faculties of the mind, nevertheless, according to the definition of science which we have given above, memory and imagination can have no part in the division of science, since they can have no share in the acquisition of what we have termed common principles. Reason alone holds sway over this department. We reject the division of the authors of the "Encyclopædia" for nearly the same reason, since the foundation of their division is sub-

stantially the same as that of Bacon. The division of M. Ampère is faulty for the reason that he divides the sciences according to the different objects about which they treat, instead of stating the common principles as the basis of his division. The object of a science, and the principle on which a science rests, are two different things. Science, then, according to our definition, should be divided according to the different classes of common principles; for if we were to divide with M. Ampère according to the object, then it would follow that two different sciences could not treat of the same object, (God, for instance,) which is false, since theology and theodicy treat of the same object, God, and yet they are not the same science.

There are as many sciences, therefore, as there are distinct classes of common principles; but here arises the question, How can one series of common principles be distinguished from another? The dif-

ference of those series, we think, may be determined by the different motives of certitude on which they are founded. There are different kinds of certitude, and when the certitude of one series of principles differs from that of another series, the sciences will be different. Now, there are three sources of certitude—evidence, common-sense, and authority. From evidence arises the certitude of philosophy, properly so-called, and upon common-sense rests the certitude of the laws of bodies. Hence, the physical sciences are based upon common-sense. Now, the physical sciences treat either of the phenomena of bodies or of individual bodies, and hence we have the physical sciences proper and natural history. Authority may be either natural or supernatural. Natural authority treats of social facts; supernatural, of religious facts.

Having premised so much on science in general, we shall now proceed to give a definition of the science of philosophy.

A definition may be of two kinds; verbal or real. A verbal definition is a definition of the word. A real definition is a definition of the thing. The verbal definition of philosophy is love of wisdom. Cicero, in the fifth chapter of the Tusculan Questions, tells us "that those who formerly spent their time in the study of sciences were called *Σοφοι*" or wise men, by the Greeks. Pythagoras, however, thought this appellation too high-sounding, and hence, with an appearance of modesty, called himself simply a "lover of wisdom"—"Φιλοσοφος." Succeeding philosophers have adopted this title. As to the real definition of philosophy, it has varied with different periods. In the early ages philosophy meant no particular science, but only "the disposition of a learned mind well versed in the sciences, or at least, of one inflamed with the desire of knowledge." Objectively considered, philosophy meant science in general; but when, after the first ages of the Church, sacred

theology began to be treated as the science distinct from mere natural sciences, the name *Philosophy* was restricted to those sciences which could be learned by the exercise of natural reason, without having recourse to the authority of God's revelation. Hence, philosophy was commonly called in the schools, "Scientia ex ratione, vel cognitio ex primis principiis evidenter deducta." Philosophy, understood in this extended sense, included not only metaphysics, or the science of God, but also physical and mathematical sciences: even jurisprudence, economy, and politics, as we can prove by opening any of the philosophical works which have come down from the middle ages to our days. For in those works we find philosophy embracing four parts, logic, physics, which includes also metaphysics, mathematics, and ethics. The second of these, namely, physics, which was *then* a very limited science, has been so developed by modern discoveries that it now forms a

branch by itself. Hence, intellectual philosophy now comprises logic, which teaches the rules to be followed in the acquisition of truth ; metaphysics, which treats of being in general, as well as of spiritual being, and especially of the human soul ; and ethics, which discusses about the principles of morality. To these three parts may be added a fourth, called cosmology, which gives us some general speculations about the corporeal world.

As authors differ in giving a verbal definition of philosophy, in circumscribing its limits as well as in giving a real definition of it, we may venture to give one of our own. Philosophy, then, we identify with the first part of the definition of science already given. Hence, philosophy is a series of certain judgments based on evidence ; but as evident judgments are those which are included in the very act of thought, we may define philosophy to be the " Science of thought."

Let us run through the different parts of philosophy, in order to see how this definition will bear upon them. In the act of thought there are three things to be distinguished: the object, which is being; the subject, or mind which receives being; and the laws which govern the mind in the production of thoughts. Hence, in philosophy there are three parts: the ontological, the psychological, and the nomological. The object of thought is essentially distinguished from the subject, and it is called *idea* or being. It may be apprehended in two ways—either absolutely as being in general, or relatively as limited being. Being which is absolute or unlimited must be God, while restricted being must be a creature. Hence, ontology treats of the Creator and the creature. But as these two realities are made known to us by certain general abstract conceptions, we must discourse about those conceptions before speaking of their applications. Hence, in meta-

physics, or in the ontological part of philosophy, we have three treatises, namely, general metaphysics and special metaphysics, which is divided into theodicy or the treatise on the Creator, and cosmology, which treats of the world or creature. Psychology has but one treatise on the subject of thought — the human soul. The third part of philosophy is nomological, which treats of the laws of the mind. A law is the rule which the activity of any being must follow in order to attain the end for which it was destined. By thought itself is meant the exercise of the soul's activity. This exercise, like every other evolution of a being, is an attempt to attain some end, and this end can not be attained except by following certain laws. Hence, the laws of thought are the rules which the mind must observe in thinking in order to attain its end. But the operations of the mind are of two kinds, *cognoscitive* and *affective*, as they have reference either to the mind or

to the will. The cognoscitive or judging operations of the mind aim at the discovery of truth, while the affective deal with the love of God and the hatred of vice. The laws of thought, therefore, may be divided into two classes, since they may either govern the cognoscitive or affective operations of the mind. Logic treats of the first class, and ethics of the second. There is a little treatise called æsthetics —the science of the beautiful—which we have left out in this enumeration, but it may be considered as an appendix to theodicy.

QUESTION SECOND.

WHAT RELATION HAS PHILOSOPHY TO OTHER SCIENCES ?

 HERE is a great controversy regarding the order to be followed in studying philosophy. We have seen the different parts of this science; now the practical question arises, Which part should we treat first? One school, called the school of the dialecticians, begins by logic; another, called the school of the psychologists, begins by psychology; while another, called the ontologists, maintains that we should begin philosophy by the study of ontology. Let us weigh the reasons of these three schools. Most of the scholastics were dialecticians, and many moderns belong to the same school. The origin of this

first system is found in the great dispute between the Stoics and Peripatetics as to the nature of logic. According to the Stoics logic is a science, and hence, like all other sciences, it aims at giving us a distinct speculative knowledge of some object. Hence, logic could have the first place in philosophy only inasmuch as the object of which it treated would be the first among the objects of science; but as the Stoics denied that the object of logic was the first among the objects of science, they denied that logic should have the first place in philosophy. The Peripatetics replied that logic was not a science, but a universal instrument necessary for the study of all sciences, and hence they gave the name of *organon*, or instrument, to Aristotle's works on logic. The Peripatetics, therefore, contend that no science can be acquired unless we know the foundation of human certitude, the laws of reasoning, and the method which should be followed in investigating and distrib-

uting the different parts of science; and as logic teaches all these things, it is not a science but a universal requisite for the study of all sciences; and hence something which should precede the study of all science. Hence, we should begin the study of philosophy by logic. The psychological system is of Scotch origin; its author being Thomas Reid, the founder of the Scotch school of philosophy. In this century there have been many disciples of this system in France, the principal of whom are Royer Collard, Jouffroy, and Damiron of the Paris University. Victor Cousin, also, in many points, admits this system. These authors almost completely neglect the other parts of philosophy to devote themselves especially to the study of the thinking subject. They make psychology the foundation of all philosophy, and endeavor to refute the dialecticians as follows. They deny that logic is a necessary and universal instrument for the acquisition of science. For

the object of logic is to give us a scientific knowledge of the rules which govern the thinking faculty, and hence logic could not be called the universal instrument of science, only inasmuch as a knowledge of these rules would be necessary to every scientific disquisition. But this knowledge is not necessary. For just as we have naturally the faculty of knowing, so do we know naturally how to use it, as it were by instinct; and we know how to distinguish between truth and error without having a scientific knowledge of the laws and principles of reasoning. Thus we see every day men without education and ignorant of the rules of logic, judging correctly things that fall under their observation. Again, if logic were the universal instrument of science, it would follow that as often as we exercise the thinking faculty we should be conscious of the application of the rules of logic; we could approve of no reason without having first analyzed it logically; but experience

teaches us that this is false. Moreover, if we assert that logic is the necessary instrument in the acquisition of science, we fall into a manifest contradiction; for logic is a science, no matter what may be its object, and this science can not be learned without using the faculty of thought. This is as true of logic as of any other science. But, on the other hand, we can not say that the scientific knowledge of logic is necessary to acquire the science of logic. Therefore, logic is not a universal instrument, as the dialecticians would have it. The psychologists, however, do not despise logic. They acknowledge its utility in common with that of all sciences; and they admit that it aids us in the investigation of truth. Truth being the object of the intellect, the knowledge of it is useful and necessary; and as logic helps us in this investigation, it is a useful science, and in many respects superior to the other sciences; because to know the laws of our thought is

one of the objects most deserving our attention. Besides, logic is extremely useful, because, say the psychologists, perhaps there is no science in which the mind's reflecting power is so well drilled ; and although, without the knowledge of logic, we may reason and investigate truth, still it is only the experienced logician who can easily refute sophisms and defend truth. After having thus destroyed the arguments of the dialecticians, the psychologists proceed to show that the study of their science should precede the study of logic. The object of logic is to determine the laws of thought ; but as the laws of thought can not be apprehended unless the nature of thought be first understood, it follows that psychology, which analyzes thought, and explains its nature, should come before logic. Indeed, the dialecticians must admit this in practice if not in theory. For there is hardly one of them who does not analyze the cognoscitive faculties of the mind, be-

fore describing the laws of reason. In truth, then, the dispute between the dialecticians and psychologists would seem to be merely verbal. On the same ground the psychologists endeavor to show the priority of psychology to every other part of intellectual philosophy. For, in the first place, the knowledge of one's self should go before all other knowledge, since we should know what we are before knowing other objects. Again, our faculties are the means of acquiring all science; and hence, we should first study their nature before that of any thing else. Next in order comes the system of the ontologists. Men of marked ability—some of the greatest philosophers of the age—defend the system which holds the priority of the ontological order in the science of philosophy. These, on the one hand, admit the reasoning of the psychologists against the dialecticians, while at the same time they reject the psychological method. They contend that on-

tology should have the first place in philosophy, because this method is more in conformity with the order of priority which the objects of philosophy hold among themselves in the primitive act of thought and in reflection. For the object of thought is prior to the subject in the order of real existence. The object is conceived as something absolute and necessary, while the subject is relative and contingent, and the absolute and necessary precede the contingent in the order of reality. Besides, thought is primarily constituted by the intuition of the object, and it is only by a kind of rebound from the object, in the act of intuition, that the soul becomes conscious of itself. Moreover, the reflexive order requires also this ontological priority. We mean by the reflexive order, that which is distinguished from the intuitive order. In the intuitive order the mind is conceived by a logical, if not by a real instant, as passive; but in the reflexive order, the mind

acts, and thus evolves its activity. For, if we go back by the aid of memory into the history of our past life, we shall observe that the first object to which the soul directed its attention, was not itself, or its operations, but exterior things. For we knew how to distinguish external objects from one another, nay, even to reason abstractly about them, before we had apprehended ourselves by a distinct thought. The principal objection against this system is one that holds equally good against the other two. It is said that it is impossible to treat the objective part of philosophy without supposing many things from psychology and logic. This difficulty is unanswerable. Hence, we reject the three systems, not for the purpose of making a fourth, but with the intention of giving what we consider to be the true view on the subject.

Philosophy is the science of thought. Now, as every science must begin by its elements, the science of philosophy must

begin by treating of the elements of thought. The elements of thought are three. The subject, the object, and the copula, or link between subject and object. Hence, we should begin philosophy by simultaneously treating the logical, psychological, and the ontological parts. The error of each of these three systems consists in not admitting what is true in the systems of its adversaries. The student of philosophy should then pursue three classes at the same time. But, for convenience sake, it is best to begin by logic.

Having thus defined the nature of the science of philosophy, let us now see what relation it bears to the other sciences. A science, we said, was a series of truths reduced to unity by means of common principles. Hence, in every science, these three things are to be considered, namely, 1st. The general notions which constitute its subject-matter. 2d. The foundation on which their certitude is

based. 3d. The relation of the particular conclusions to the general principles. Now, it is very easy to show, that all other rational sciences are subject to philosophy in these three respects. It is evident, as far as the first part is concerned; for the general notions of any science must be apprehended by thought; and as philosophy is the science of thought, these general notions belong primarily to philosophy, whose object it is to explain them. Again, the same may be said of the foundation on which the certitude of every science is built. For that foundation is either the common-sense of nature, or some authority either sacred or profane; but we shall hereafter demonstrate that neither common-sense nor authority is the ultimate criterion of certitude; but that both rest on evidence, which is the foundation of philosophical certitude. Therefore, the certitude of all sciences is based on philosophy. The arrangements of the judgments constituting

any science, consist, especially, in deducing them legitimately from each other. But one judgment is deduced from another by means of reasoning, and as it is the province of philosophy to determine the laws of reasoning, it follows that, in this third respect also, all other sciences are subordinate to philosophy. This subordination of other sciences to philosophy is called the philosophy of science, and it consists in reducing the fundamental conceptions of any science to its first principles in assigning the last foundation of its certitude, and in giving the reason of the order of its subject-matter. The name philosophy of science, however, is sometimes understood in a different sense; as there are some sciences which have a double object, namely, to expose certain facts, or determine their laws and causes. This latter object is sometimes called the philosophy of science. From this subordination of all sciences to philosophy we again see its utility and importance.

QUESTION THIRD.

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MENTAL AND ORAL TERMS ?

THERE are two kinds of terms—mental and oral; the mental term means the idea, and the oral term the means by which we render the mental term visible, or the expression of an idea. These terms are the foundation of human logic; but human logic is but the copy of divine, sublime, or transcendental logic. The human, mental term, we say, is the idea, and the idea is God, the essence of God, the *λόγος* of Plato, (the word of God,) the *οὐ λόγος* of St. John. The word of God is the repository of ideas. God sees ideas in his word, and his word is God, and hence God sees

ideas in God, as the *ό λογος*, or the word, not in God as the Father. Hence, the *λογος* is the mental term of God, and the *λογος* incarnate is the oral term of God; the *ό λογος* of St. John, the *ό λογος σαρκα εγενετο* of God is the incarnation of his mental term. So, *Quantum licet parva componere magnis*, our oral term is the incarnation, as it were, of our mental term. Therefore God's oral term and God's mental term are the same. Our mental term and God's are also the same. Yet, for all this, we are not God, for our mental term is outside of us. God's mental term is inside of him; but our oral term is more like God's oral term; for his oral term, or the incarnation, is outside of him just as our oral term is outside of us. Hence, God's logic and man's logic have the same object. God's truth or God's logic is man's truth or man's logic; that is to say, it is derived from God himself. This is reducing human logic to its primary principles; it is

building logic on its real foundation—on God, the supreme reality. Hence, our logic is real logic—truth.

There is but one truth, one species of truth. Logical, metaphysical, and moral are but one truth; for truth is the equality between being and the intellect apprehending beings; but being is not truth, but being as apprehended by the intellect is truth. Without the intellect there is no truth, for truth essentially supposes an intellect. Without being there is no truth, for without being the intellect could apprehend nothing, and nothing could not be truth; truth could not come from nothing.

Truth is, then, a relation between being and intellect. Being is that which is; the intellect is that which apprehends that which is; and the relation, the essential relation, between that which is, or being, and the faculty which apprehends that which is, is truth. Now, as this relation between the intellect and being is never

changed, neither is truth changed. Hence, the division of truth into logical, metaphysical, and moral, may imply different modes of truth, but not different species of it; if it implied different species, the division would have to be rejected by us who found all science on reality—on things as they are.

This distinction between our mental and oral term gives us the real distinction between truth as it is in itself, and truth as expressed in language. Truth in itself is one and indivisible; truth in speech is multiple. It is divided in passing through the mind as the colors of light are separated by a prism. All truths are but scintillations of one truth, of the truth eternal and immutable. Our mind, being finite, can consider truth by reflection only in analysis. Truth in synthesis is intued by the mind; but it can not be reflected in the present condition of the intellect without logical divisions and distinctions. The mind, in presence of truth, sees it all

in a confused state, but can not clothe it in a sensible shape, so that others may reflect upon it, unless it be robed in garments of many colors.

QUESTION FOURTH.

WHAT IS THE CRITERION OF CERTITUDE?
DEGREES OF CERTITUDE.

BY the criterion of certitude we mean the last foundation of all certitude. This criterion must be an infallible sign of truth; for if it could admit the possibility of an error, or need the assistance of another means to detect error, it would not be the last foundation of truth. In the second place, the criterion of certitude must be self-evident; for if it were not, we should have to go beyond it to find the last foundation of truth. The criterion must also be universal; that is to say, all the other motives of certitude must rest upon it as

their basis. For, if all the motives of certainty did not rest on it, we would have certitude outside of its criterion, and consequently it could not be called the last foundation of truth.

Authors do not agree on the criterion of certitude. We hold that it is evidence. We define evidence to be, "The perfect equality between receptive and active thought;" between the act of the mind affirming its perceptions, and the intuitions of the mind receiving its ideas. All certainty, whether of common-sense or of authority, is based on this internal fact of the equality between receptive and active thought.

In the first place, evidence is an infallible sign of truth. It is a motive of certitude, as we all know; and there is no other motive presupposed by it.

Evidence is self-evident; for it is internal to the mind, and it is impossible by any straining of thought to conceive anything prior to it in the mind, since it is

in the very essence of every mental act. Receptive facts are the first element of thought, and evidence consists in the equality between them and the judgments which affirm them.

Finally, evidence is the universal foundation of certainty. Besides evidence, there are only two other motives of certitude—common-sense and authority—and both these motives rest on evidence. Common-sense is the invincible propensity of our nature to affirm certain things to be true. But does not evidence tell us of the existence of such a propensity, and of the presence of such judgments in our mind? As for authority, it is evident that it presupposes evidence, since authority presupposes even common-sense. How can we know the existence of authority, unless we use our senses; and does not the certainty of the senses presuppose the certainty of judgments, which is the certainty of evidence?

This is the system of Des Cartes, who

was the first philosopher to investigate the nature of the criterion of certitude.

A very common error regarding certitude is that it admits of degrees. This error is founded in a misconception of the nature of certainty. Some authors, especially theologians, distinguish two kinds of certitude: that of faith, and that of reason. The certitude of faith they consider greater than that of reason. Others distinguish in certitude two elements: the exclusion of fear of error, and the firmness of mental adhesion. Considered under the first aspect, they deny that there are degrees in certitude; but they contend that the adhesion of the mind to truth may be greater or less, and consequently, in this respect, they admit degrees in certitude, according to the greater or less number of motives.

Now, certitude consists in the essential connection of our judgments with truth; but there can be no degrees in such a connection. If this connection of a judgment

with truth could admit of degrees, it would be either because there could be a greater or less doubt or fear of error, or because there could be a greater or less adhesion of the mind to truth. But neither of these hypotheses can be maintained.

Not the first one; for where there is doubt, or fear of error, there can be no certitude, though there may be a greater or less probability. Nor can the second be held; for the firmness of mental adhesion in itself adds nothing to the connection of a judgment with truth, for we know by experience that the mind can adhere as pertinaciously to error as to truth.

It is a great error, therefore, to say that we are more or less certain. Certitude is like a simple point, and can not have degrees in it. In the last analysis all certitude is reduced to evidence, which is the basis of all scientific certitude. Scientific certitude should never be confounded with probability.

QUESTION FIFTH.

WHAT IS THE TRUE NOTION OF AN IDEA?

THE word *idea* has different meanings with different authors. It is sometimes used to signify an opinion or judgment, and again it is applied to the elements of judgment. We mean by idea the object of thought. As we have already remarked, the analysis of thought gives us three elements—the subject, the bond, and the object. Let us examine the nature of *ideas*. We remark, before entering on this question, that no thought is possible without an idea; for when the mind thinks it perceives, but this act supposes an object perceived, and hence it supposes an idea, for idea and object of thought are one

and the same thing. What, then, is an idea? Is it a reality? and if so, is it a possible or existing one? and if it be an existing reality, what kind of existence has it?

Thomas Reid, founder of the so-called Scotch school of philosophy, in his work entitled "Essays on the Faculties of the Mind," denies that an *idea* is a reality, and asserts it to be a conception or image formed by the mind itself. Hence we can be certain of nothing by means of ideas. He denied the axiom of the schools, "*Ideas nostras mensuram esse possibilis et impossibilis*," which means that an idea always implied at least a possibility. He gives us examples of many things of which we have ideas, but which are impossible and absurd, for example, a winged horse. It is objected to this system of Reid that it leads to *scepticism*, because, as there is no connection between the ideas and the things which they represent, we can not acquire a knowledge of

the things themselves ; and that the passage from the subject to the object is impossible, and hence that all certitude is destroyed.

He endeavors to evade this difficulty in the following manner. As he abhors scepticism and does not wish to be classed among sceptics, he invents a faculty which he calls external perception, by means of which corporal realities existing outside ourselves are apprehended. In this faculty there are three elements, 1st. The conception of an object formed *à priori* by the mind. 2d. An affirmation of the object's real existence. 3d. An immediate persuasion of the truth of this affirmation. Whenever we know an object in this manner we are certain of its existence. This is the sum of Reid's system. The difficulty, however, is only evaded, not solved. For after all, even in the case of this external perception, the idea is but a *fetus* of the mind, having in it no objectivity. But how can that which has no

objectivity in it make us certain of the real existence of an object? He answers by dividing ideas into two classes. In one of these classes we have the affirmation and the immediate persuasion as above explained; in the other there is a simple representation, pure conception without reality. In the first case we have external perception, by which we apprehend an object not merely possible, but enjoying actual existence. But still the difficulty is unsolved; for every idea must imply a real object. Idea is the object of thought, and if this object be not a being it is nothing. "Si non est Ens est non Ens." But the mind can not think nothing, as an object for thought essentially implies a real object distinct from itself. To think nothing and not to think at all are one and the same thing. No idea, therefore, can be a mere spectre conjured up from the depths of the soul. Again, three hypotheses may be made with regard to the connection of ideas

with being. Either all ideas are, or all ideas are not, or some are and some are not realities according to certain circumstances given by Reid. But the two last suppositions are absurd ; for if there be no reality in any idea, there can be no judgment either certain or doubtful ; for there will be nothing upon which to judge ; and we can not give reality to some ideas and deny it to others according to certain circumstances, because circumstances do not change the *essence* of intellectual perception. This essence consists in the intuition of an object ; but this intuition either implies the reality of an object, or it does not. If it does, then the connection must always exist ; if it does not, it can never exist. Nor will it do for the Scotch philosophers to assert that the presence of an affirmation with an immediate persuasion will decide the question of the object's reality, for as we have already remarked, how can these circumstances give reality to an idea which is

unreal? Besides, the affirmation which distinguishes the real ideas from the phantasms must be a judgment. Reid, therefore, makes the judgment the measure of our ideas; whereas, in point of fact, it is ideas that are the measures of our judgments.

Another system on the nature of our ideas is that called the system of the intelligible species or of representative ideas. This system contends that an idea is a being, in the sense that its existence in the mind always proves the existence of some reality either existing or possible outside of the mind. The being of idea, however, is not being in itself, but the medium or image through which being is made intelligible. Ideas in this system are the mirrors in which the faces of beings are reflected; hence the mind does not immediately apprehend being, but only its image; and thus it judges from the image to the existence of the reality. All masters in this school, however, do

not agree in explaining their system, for there are two hypotheses. According to St. Thomas and the other Christian followers of this system, ideas are certain forms or representations of things which God imprints on our soul, either successively or in the first instance of its creation. The system thus explained is commonly taught in the schools; but it was not thus understood by its pagan inventors. Democritus and Epicurus considered ideas as the images or species which physical objects produced in us. According to those authors, bodies emit particles which form images of the bodies. The image of each body thus formed passes through the senses to that part of the brain called anciently "sensorium commune." This image is as yet material, but the acting intellect now takes it up, etherealizes it, and produces from it a spiritual image of the body from which it emanated. The passive intellect can now contemplate this chemically formed idea

of the external object. The system thus explained is pure materialism. For in it there is no account made of the existence of spiritual realities, nor is there any means of having their ideas.

But this school of philosophers, whether Pagan or Christian, does not give us the true explanation of the nature of ideas. Ideas are not images or representations of objects ; for in order that one thing should be the image of another, it is necessary in the first place that we should have an idea of the thing represented, as well as of its representation ; and that we should be able to assert a similarity between the image and the object. If either of these two conditions be wanting, there is no true representation. But the system of representative ideas fulfills neither of them ; for by it we have only a notion of the image. The object represented is not perceived by the mind.

And as representative ideas have no being in themselves, (for if they had

these, our mind would perceive being immediately,) there can be no means of deciding a similarity between the idea and the object. The idea in this system is either being or it is not. If it be being, then the mind immediately apprehends being, and there is no necessity for inventing the intelligible species as the media between realities and the mind. If it be not being, it must be nothing ; it can represent nothing. Moreover, we have ideas of the infinite and the necessary being ; for we know what is meant when we hear this being spoken of. Now how could an image or intelligible species be the representative idea of this object ? since there would be no similitude between the object and the image, the one being infinite and the other finite. Yet similarity between the object and image is necessary to constitute true representation. Therefore this system, besides other defects, has that of not being able to ex-

plain the origin of the idea of God in our mind.

The third system with regard to the nature of ideas teaches that they are being in themselves; hence idea and being mean one and the same thing; so that being as well as idea may be defined that which terminates our mind as the object of thought. We must naturally admit this system since we have rejected that of Reid and of St. Thomas. It follows as a necessary consequence, from what has thus far been argued; for if we apprehend being from ideas, as all admit, not even excepting the Scotch school, which admits the apprehension of being by ideas, at least in the case of external perception; and if, again, ideas, as mere images, can not be the instrument by which being is apprehended, it follows that we must apprehend being in itself. Ideas and being are, therefore, identified in signification.

QUESTION SIXTH.

IS IDEA A POSSIBLE BEING, OR AN EXISTING
ONE ? SYSTEM OF ROSMINI.

ANTHONY ROSMINI SERBATI was born at Roveredo, in the Tyrol, on the 25th of March, 1797, and died in the beginning of July, 1855. He is one of the greatest of the Italian philosophers, and stands on an equal footing with Gioberti and Cardinal Gerdil. He founded the Society of Charity, which was sanctioned by the Pope as a religious congregation in 1838. His theological and philosophical works fill thirty volumes in octavo, the chief of which is *Nuovo Saggio sull' Origine dell' Idee*, which he published in four volumes, and in which his philosophical system is

contained. It may be summed up as follows: In order to explain the phenomena of the human mind, we should admit no more nor no less than is sufficient. But this principle has not been followed out by the different schools of philosophy. The mind, in order to judge, necessarily requires certain general notions which are not the products of the mind, for the mind finds them as the materials with which it makes its judgments.

There is in our mind, therefore, an idea, the basis of all other ideas, and yet not produced by our intellect. Whence comes it, then, if not from the mind? Here, says Rosmini, we have different systems. Locke, Condillac, and the Sensist school say this primary idea, these primary notions, come from sensations. Reid makes them come from a natural and primitive judgment, of which all the elements are subjective. Dugald Stewart derives them from the common name used to designate a collection of similar objects, which the

intellect does not, however, perceive as a collection, but individually. These systems do not admit all that is necessary to explain the facts of the human mind. They sin by defect. The other class of philosophers sin by excess—at least in the opinion of Rosmini—for they admit more than is necessary to explain the presence of ideas in our minds. Plato, Leibnitz, and Kant make all ideas innate. But Rosmini shows that ideas engender each other ; that they can be derived from one ; and hence there is no necessity of having all in the mind from the beginning. It is in refuting these different systems, then, that Rosmini explains his own. He maintains that an analysis of our ideas will show them all to be modifications of the fundamental idea of *being in general*. From this idea we can deduce all others, and without it none are possible. This idea is, therefore, innate. But this *being in general* is not a real, absolute, concrete, and existing being, is not

God, as Gioberti and the Ontologists hold, but it is possible being in general. It is not a fetus of the mind, however, for it has an objectivity in itself. It is not God, nor yet a creature, but, like an intelligible atmosphere, it is an eternal and necessary light emanating from God, by means of which our intelligence contemplates all ideas.

Rosmini then endeavors to explain the process by which all other ideas are derived from the idea of being in general. According to him, the idea of being constitutes the *à priori* part or *form* of all cognition. In order to determine this *form* in individual cases, the *matter* must be supplied by the senses. We give the translation of Rosmini's words: "If there be something else in our idea besides the conception of being, this something else is only a mode of being itself, so that it can be truly said of every idea that it is either being conceived, or being more or less determined by its modes. The mat-

ter of thought, or *à posteriori* cognition, gives each particular determination of the idea of being in general. When we wish, then, to explain the origin of ideas, we must explain two things: 1st. The manner in which we obtain the conception of being. 2d. The manner in which we obtain the different determinations to which being is subject. But, as we have demonstrated that the conception of being is innate, there no longer remains any difficulty, for the different determinations of the ideas of being are manifestly derived from the senses." (Essay, vol. ii. sec. 5, cap. 1.)

He exemplified his theory by the manner in which we apprehend a ball of ivory. The first idea in the mind is the idea of possible being. We think a being, and this is the intelligible element, the *à priori* part of the thought. Then, by means of sensation, we observe the weight, color, and shape of the ball, and this is the matter of thought. Thus, we

have a particular determination of the idea of possible being. Hence, in accordance with this theory, Rosmini endeavors to establish a proposition entitled, "The double cause of acquired ideas is the idea of being and sensation." But, as the idea of being in general gives the *form* to our thought, and is the principle of our cognoscitive faculty, the origin of our ideas may be said to be, without restriction, the idea of being in general. We must not, however, confound idea and judgment. There are two means by which we may have thought: either by intuition or affirmation. The first deals with possible beings; the second, which is a judgment, in which there are an idea and persuasion of the existence of an object, treats of existence outside the mind. But what relation has idea with judgment, or how do we pass from one to the other? Rosmini continues to explain: In the first place, the mind has the idea of being; then, by means of sensations, a

judgment is produced, which is equivalent to the formula, "That which I feel exists." This judgment has two elements: the idea of its object, and the persuasion of its real existence.

If the mind separate the second element from the first by a process which Rosmini calls *Universalizzazione*, we shall have the simple idea. This universalization, however, is not the same as abstraction; for, although, when we universalize we abstract from the existence of a thing, nevertheless we leave it as a type or representation what it always was; whereas, when we abstract, we take away a part of the object or one of its properties, and thus give rise to new ideal combinations. For instance, the senses show me a tree. I immediately say it exists, and here there is a judgment as to the existence. But I can conceive this tree abstractly, apart from its existence, as merely possible. Here, then, I universalize. I have a concrete and universal idea, which

may be looked upon as a species or type participable by individuals *ad infinitum*. But if I consider a tree in general, or certain properties of it, I abstract. Hence, universalization gives us ideas. Abstraction gives them different terms, and changes the manner of representing them. Three things, therefore, are to be noted with regard to universalization. 1st. There is a corporeal sensation, a phantasm, or perception by the senses. 2d. A wedding which takes place in the unity of our conscience between this sensation and the idea of being in general—this is intellectual perception. In the intellectual perception there are a judgment on the existence of an object and an idea of the object obtained by the process of universalization. 3d. The separation of the judgment from the idea by means of abstraction, so that we may have the idea alone. This idea was universal from the very beginning, but as it was hidden in an individual, it needs this separation to

be seen in its universality. Hence, as we have already said, all ideas are the idea of a being in general, modified by the senses. Hence, possible being in general is the form of all ideas. It is the instrument by which the mind renders an object intelligible. It is the necessary means of all knowledge, the light of the mind, and the form of every human intelligence.

The great merit of Rosmini in inventing this system consists in his having given the death-blow to materialism or sensism; for although this degrading school of philosophy had been supplanted in France by rationalistic electricism, it still continued to be taught in Italy by Romagnosi. Galuppi, it is true, attacked it, but he was too fond of the system of Locke to be able to give materialism a complete overthrow. Rosmini completely destroyed it; but he went so far to the other extreme as almost to fall into the contrary errors arising from the transcen-

dental philosophy of the Germans. Hence he plants his system nearly on the same platform as that of Kant; for after demolishing the other system of philosophy, he writes thus of Kant: "Kant came after these. He gave a more accurate and profound analysis of our cognitions when he asserted that they are the result of two elements—one sensible and not innate, the other not sensible, and hence to be looked for in our mind. He properly calls one of these the *matter*, the other the *form* of thought. Hence he does not make all ideas innate in themselves as Plato does; nor in their vestiges, as Leibnitz; but he makes only the formal part of ideas innate, so that all ideas according to Kant are factitious, but not in every respect. This was a notable step in the progress of philosophical science. (Essay, vol. ii. sec. 5. "Theoria dell' origine dell' Idee.")

According to Rosmini, therefore, the system of the philosopher of Königsberg

is substantially good and acceptable, provided we lop off its superfluous excrescences. He partly admits Kant's system; for he says that the *formal* must be distinguished from the *material* part in cognition, and that the *formal* part alone is innate. He endeavors to simplify Kant's system by reducing the seventeen *mental* forms to the idea of *being in general*, and making them objective. "The mental forms of Kant," he continued, "were seventeen, two being from the senses external and internal, twelve from the intellect, called by him pure conceptions or categories, and three of our reason, to which he gave the name of ideas. This number of forms is too great, and the formal part of reason is far more simple." He then goes on to show that the idea of *possible being in general* is the foundation and formal part of all ideas.

The great mistake of Rosmini lay in his imagining that a system which was the extreme of *materialism* should be

necessarily right; whereas, in fact, German transcendentalism is quite as erroneous and dangerous as sensism. You can not build the edifice of truth on an erroneous foundation. Indeed, the refutation of Rosmini's system follows from what has been already said. Idea is being, not an image or subjective conception of the mind, and hence it must have concrete and existing reality in itself; for if we suppose it to have existence in another being, then idea would be perceptible only in this being. Possible being in general is only potential in itself; hence it must have its existence in another being which is concrete and existing. It is, then, in fact, concrete and existing being which terminates our intellect, even when we have the idea of possible being in general; hence the object of our mind must be existing and not possible being. Again, possible being in general has no reality in itself; for that which really exists is determined and

concrete, not general and possible; hence if being in general were the object of our intellect, our mind would not perceive reality in itself, which is contrary to what Rosmini would desire. Besides, possible being in general merely indicates a power possessed by a real and existing being. This power, when used, causes possible beings to pass from the state of potentiality to that of act; but an idea must be real being, as we have shown; therefore, possible being in general is not the fountain of our ideas. Moreover, Rosmini makes this possible being neither a creature nor yet the Creator, but a mysterious and (as he calls it) a terrible idea.

Now, as Rosmini gives this idea of possible being in general to some of the attributes of God, we can not see how he can distinguish it from the Creator. This being in general must be nothing at all, or else it must be either a creature or the Creator; and, as Rosmini will admit it to

be neither of the two first, it must be reduced to the last; for a vague, indefinite, infinite abstraction like Rosmini's *possible being in general* is a metaphysical absurdity.

QUESTION SEVENTH.

WHAT KIND OF EXISTENCE HAS IDEA ?
SYSTEM OF GIOBERTI.

N order to answer this question correctly, namely, What kind of existence has idea ? we must distinguish three kinds of existences—the soul, other finite existences, and necessary being. There are four opinions on this point. The first is that of Fichte, a German philosopher, which places all the objectivity of our ideas in the thinking principle or in the *το εγω*.

Fichte supposes the mind to have the power of presenting itself to itself, as the object of thought ; so that it is at the same time both subject and object. Hence the mind is every thing, and every thing is

in the mind, as its different modifications. Hence the idea of God as well as the idea of creature, is nothing but the idea of the mind making itself the object of its own intellectual faculties. This system is fully explained by Fichte in the appendix to his theodicy.

This system is refuted by what geometers call “*reductio ad absurdum* ;” for if we suppose for an instant that the subject and object of thought are identified, it will follow that what is finite is at the same time infinite.

Two conditions are necessary to realize Fichte’s hypothesis. First, that the thinking subject should really apprehend itself as the object of thought ; secondly, that the thinking subject thus apprehended as the object of thought should have all the characteristics of the real object of thought. But in the first place, the mind does *not* apprehend itself as the object of thought ; for if it did, we should be conscious of the fact ; we should feel that we were thought

as well as that we think. Each of us would not only say, "I think," but "I am thought." Now, no matter how much we may reflect, we are only conscious that we think, not that we are thought. Our intellect never apprehends the object of thought as identified with the subject. Again, the thinking subject considered as the object of thought could not have all the characteristics of the ideal object which we apprehend; because we intue an objective reality as distinct and separate from, and independent of us, having full being in itself. Besides, we have the idea of an infinite object, necessarily existing and possessing a creative power; but it is evident that the thinking subject has not a single one of these qualities. It is not independent of, nor separate from, us, for it is *we*, our *personality*. It is not *infinite*, it does not necessarily exist, nor can it create; but if it were the object of thought, it should have these qualities. Moreover, the mind

as the object of thought can not be different from the mind as the subject of thought; but our conscience or intimate sense tells us that our soul as the subject of thought is finite, contingent, and mutable. Hence it must be finite, contingent, and mutable as object of thought, which it is not, and hence it can not be the object of thought.

Fichte's system, which destroys the reality of God's existence and that of the world—or better, which identifies God and the world with the human soul by an unintelligible pantheism, is defended by two principal arguments. He says *that* must be the object of thought, without which it is impossible to apprehend any thing, and without which the passage from the subject to the object of thought is impossible. But such is the soul; for unless the soul be its own object, how will you span the chasm between the subject and object of thought?

The answer is easily given. We deny

the soul to be the complete cause of our apprehension. We know the fact that the mind apprehends, but the manner in which it apprehends we know not. The mode of the intellectual act is a mystery which can not be solved. We know that there is no contradiction in asserting that the mind apprehends an object distinct from itself, though we be unable to comprehend *how* the intellect apprehends the object. Besides, it is not more easy to comprehend Fichte's system in this regard than that which he attacks ; for, let him say what he will, we must always suppose, if not a real at least a logical distinction between the subject and the object. The subject is not the subject in the same way that it is the object of thought, and hence there is not a complete identity between the subject and the object. Yet he says there must be this identity ; for if they be distinct, how can they become united by intellectual apprehension ? Either the subject

must walk out of itself to apprehend the object, or the object must jump out of itself to be received by the subject. Still the difficulty remains; for with this logical distinction between the subject and object, there is the same necessity for the jumping process as in the case of a real distinction. But, in fact, the objection of Fichte does not hold good; for the object and subject touch each other intellectually, and thus the subject apprehends the object without either of these being obliged to go out of itself. Moreover, every philosopher knows that the *mode* or the *how* of intellectual apprehension is one of those natural mysteries so frequent in philosophy, inexplicable but not absurd. Hence Fichte's system is to be rejected.

The second opinion with regard to the kind of existence which idea possesses, is that of Reid, which we have already partially explained; and the third is that of St. Thomas, which has also been given.

St. Thomas makes the object of thought distinct from the subject. This object is identified with contingent beings, and God is not immediately intued by the mind. The idea of God is derived from the idea of created existences. Now, although we may not say that created existences may not be the object of intellectual vision, still, we deny that they make up the sufficient object; for in order that the objectivity of our ideas should exist wholly in contingent facts, one condition is necessary. The contingent must include in itself whatever is the object of our thought. But it does not; for besides contingent we perceive necessary being, and besides the finite we have an idea of the infinite, and conscience bears testimony to the fact. But contingent facts can not include the idea of the necessary and infinite. The infinite idea must be in an infinite object. Finite and contingent are ideas that come after the idea of the infinite and necessary. Hence, the

system of St. Thomas, gives us only one series of objects, namely, objects that are finite. Nor does it explain even the manner in which we apprehend these. For we have already refuted his system of image ideas, or intelligible species.

Let us now examine the system of Gioberti. This great philosopher was born in Piedmont, in the beginning of the present century, and died in Paris not many years ago. Shortly after his ordination he was made Chaplain of the Court, and Professor of Philosophy in the University of Turin. On account of his political principles he was exiled in 1833, went to Paris, and afterward to Brussels. He returned to Italy during the troubles of 1848, and was made Prime Minister of Charles Albert. He wrote many works, most of them on philosophical subjects. All were put on the Index shortly before his death. Few of them are free from error, and all of them deserved to be condemned “in odium auctoris,” for the bit-

ter attacks made by him against the Court of Rome, and the learned and zealous "Society of Jesus." It is certain that he died excommunicated, and very probably a Pantheist. Yet Gioberti is, without doubt, the greatest philosopher of the nineteenth century.

This age is revolutionary, but its revolutions are caused as much by principles and ideas, as by the force of arms. It endeavors to lay aside all supernatural religion; but not being able to do so without something to put in its stead, it exalts and deifies every thing natural. Hence, we see, where revelation has been rejected, a longing after the mystic, the wonderful, the preternatural, the extraordinary, manifesting itself in politics, in religion, and in philosophy. Its fruits are socialism, spiritism, rationalism, and pantheism. It has produced men like St. Simon, Pierre Léroux, the Père Enfantin, Hegel and Schelling, Lamartine, Victor Hugo, and above them all Gioberti.

We have to remark of Gioberti's character as it appears in his writings, that he was too violent in his denunciations, too exaggerated in his theories, though we do not believe that his system of metaphysics as given in his "Introduction to the Study of Philosophy" has ever been satisfactorily refuted. Hence, while we condemn him as a ruthless assailant of the Jesuits, in the "Gesuita Moderno," and in the Prologomena to the "Primato d'Italia," we admire his genius and learning. His errors have been so great and numerous that they cause every thing from him to be suspected; "Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes." In fact, it must be admitted, that Gioberti has done much harm to religion and to society. His style is powerful and eloquent; torrent-like, it carries away the reader's imagination, and hence, it has a special tendency to exalt the minds of the young with vague theories and ethereal systems.

The system of Gioberti has been well

translated into English in Brownson's Quarterly Review. Gioberti makes the immediate intuition of God, while Des Cartes makes the soul the basis of his system. Hence, Gioberti is a strong opponent of Des Cartes, and ridicules him at every step in his *Introduzione*. Among other hard things, Gioberti says this of the French philosopher: "Non credo in tutti gli annalli del genere humano, se posse trovare un esempio di temerita e di leggerezza simile a questo."*

Gioberti's system may be summed up as follows:

The philosopher may start either from the subject or object. If he start from the subject, he may either take realities existing outside of our mind, or the representations *in* our mind as the fulcrum of his system. Reason determines the realities, and conscience or intimate

* "I do not believe that in all the annals of mankind, you can find an example of rashness and levity similar to those of this man, (Des Cartes.)"

sense, determines the images. The object of reason is the intelligible. Of conscience the proper object is the sensible, contained in the internal modifications of the mind. The one is ontological, the other psychological. "Ontology," says Gioberti, "is as old as the world, and may be found in the different systems of philosophy, both pagan and Christian, up to the days of that philosophical heretic, René Des Cartes. It is the basis of Oriental philosophy, from which it passed into the school of the Pythagoricians, Eleatics, and of Plato, among the Greeks. Ontologism was taught in the school of Alexandria, by the early Christian Fathers, and by the Realists of the middle ages. It is true that the Nominalists and Conceptualists were somewhat opposed to it, but it was especially René Des Cartes who broke the golden chain of ontological tradition, by putting the *internal* sensible instead of the objective intelligible. Gioberti puts the foundation of all philoso-

phy in the immediate vision of God, which he calls the ideal vision, "Visione Ideale." All philosophy in this system must start from the idea, the province of philosophy being to work upon idea, and evolve it by reflection. But the idea is not a mere image or representation of the object; it is the object itself, and is called being autonomastically. Creatures in the system of Gioberti are called existences. *Being* is, therefore, the "*primum philosophicum*," the principle and cause of all things,* and hence the "*primum psychologicum*" and the "*primum ontologicum*" are its effects, have their last reason in it. Now, the intuition or vision of being imparts an apodictic judgment in which all evidence and certainty are based. Gioberti explains this as follows: "The

* By the "*primum psychologicum*" is meant the first idea, and by "*primum ontologicum*" the first thing. But as the first idea and the first thing are the same in the system of *Gioberti*, hence, *being* is the "*primum philosophicum*," the basis of all reality, and of all the *knowable*.

idea of being contains this judgment—being *is* necessarily. In pronouncing this, the mind is not a judge, but merely a witness or hearer of a judgment which does not go out of the mind itself. Being proposes itself to the mind's eye, and says, 'I am necessarily.' In this objective affirmation we have the foundation of all evidence and certitude." (Introduzione, vol. ii. chap. 1.)

The first step that philosophy makes, is to repeat this judgment by reflection. Gioberti says, "The repetition of the objective and divine judgment, made by means of reflection, is the first link in the chain of philosophy." But in order to make this repetition, we need *speech* or *language*, which is the bridge or passage in our mind from the direct to the reflex state.*

We quote from Gioberti: "Between the primitive divine judgment and the

* The nature of the direct and reflex state will be explained hereafter.

secondary human judgment, that is to say, between intuition and reflection, speech acts as the medium. It is by means of language that intuitive truth becomes accessible to reflection." The necessity of speech arises from the necessity of circumscribing the idea of being, and of concentrating the mind to contemplate it in a limited form. In short, a word is like a niche in which idea puts itself to be apprehended by the mind. The sum of all this is, that the mind intues God as being, and all things in Him. Hence, being is the foundation of reflection, and consequently of all philosophy. Gioberti speaks: "L'ente e in effetto' il supremo criterio, e giudicatorio del vero, il supremo assioma di tutto lo scibile, perche' e l' intelligibilita' e l'evidenza stessa delle cose."

The intuition of God as being, gives us only a knowledge of His attributes and existence. But besides these conceptions, we have others that regard creatures.

Whence came these? Gioberti replies by the idea of creation, which is the means of passing from God to finite existence. We intue God as real, not as merely *possible being*. But, as it is a fact that His being is always cause and creator, so, in the intuition of His being, we also have His creating act and its effect. Beholding God, we see the divine creation, and those things that receive existence by it. Hence, the ideal formula, the foundation of the whole system: Being creates existences, "Ens creat existentias." Gioberti thus speaks of his ideal formula, "La vera formula ideale suprema base di tutto lo scibile, de la quale andavano intracia peno dunque essere ensciata in questi termini, l'ente crealee estenze." (Vol. ii., cap. Intro.) In this formula we have the three realities, God, the world, and the creation. The last is the bond between the first and the second. Being is the first and centre with regard to all realities. All other

ideas are, as it were, rays emanating from being, as from the centre of a circle. All conceptions, then, derived from this intuition are divided into two classes. Absolute, that regard only God or possible beings, and contingent, which concern only finite existences. But, although being is only intelligible in itself as the object of thought, there is a part of it unintelligible, namely, essence; and as all the properties of this being come from its essence, they can not be known by conceptions derived from the idea of being as the object of thought. Whence, therefore, do they come? How have we these ideas?

They are given at the same time with the idea of being which precedes them logically, but not chronologically. Hence, the conceptions of eternity, immensity, unity, infinity, etc., make what Gioberti calls the synthesis of the infinite, and this he calls a true revelation, "vera rivelazione."

The same may be said of contingent and relative conceptions, which are synchronous in our mind with the idea of contingent existences. They can not be deduced from each other, since their principle is unapprehended by us. The root of all these qualities is the essence of the *esistenza*. But this essence is as unknown to us as the essence of the *ens*. These conceptions, then, come along with the idea of being into our mind by intuition. They, too, are revealed. Intuition is, therefore, a natural revelation. Hence, all our judgments are synthetical, *à priori*, except the first, namely, being is. This synthesis, however, is not subjective, as Kant maintains, but objective, coming from the revelation of being, whose essence is unknown to us in this life. To sum up, then, all our knowledge commences by contemplating truth in itself; truth, centre of all truths, truth, God. But, as we see God concrete, not abstract, we see Him

acting by creation, and hence this ideal formula, *ens creat existentias*.

Language enables us to reflect, to evolve this formula, and thus make philosophy, which is the product of reflection. But, as in the intuition of being, as well as in the intuition of existence, the essence is always invisible to intellectual perception, it follows that all our judgments are synthetical except this one: "Being is necessarily." This is the first in the order of judgments, and the only one that is analytical.

We shall examine the arguments brought for and against this system. It is argued in favor of it, that psychologism, its opponent, begets scepticism and pantheism. It is, indeed, a fact that modern Pantheism is not the child of ontologism. The German pantheists derive their system from Kant, and Kant was a psychologist. Indeed, if we deny that the mind immediately perceives objective reality, how shall we bridge the chasm

between the subjective and objective orders? How shall we avoid scepticism, which consists precisely in a certain incapacity of man's mind to pass from the subject to the object? We have hinted at this impossibility in our refutation of the system of St. Thomas and of Reid. Again, the logical should be the same as the ontological order. But in the ontological order God holds the first place, creation the second, and existence the third. Hence, in the logical order, or order of thought, God must be first. Besides, unless we admit the immediate vision of God we never can have an idea of God. We should have to derive his intelligibility from that of creatures. That is, we should derive the infinite from the finite, as the psychologists absurdly do. There is no doubt that we apprehend God ideally, for we know what the word God means. We distinguish the idea of the infinite from every other idea. Now, this idea can be contained in no other,

indeed it must precede all other ideas. The idea of God is the idea of a being supreme by essence, self-existing, and necessary ; a being in external operation omnipotent. Now, what idea, except God himself, can represent such a being to our mind ? How could any other reality represent such a being ? For either the reality that would represent it would have the same properties as the object represented or it would not. If the first be asserted, then it would be God, for it would have infinite attributes ; and if the second be said, then we ask how could it represent to us qualities that it does not possess ? Therefore, God is apprehended ideally in himself, and not in any representative. Besides, we have shown that the object of thought is neither *possible being in general*, as Rosmini asserted, nor representative being, as the Aristotelians maintain ; therefore it must be being itself—God.

The adversaries of this system do not

dispute its power to captivate the imagination and the heart. Indeed, no one can deny its elevating influence on the mind, for there is something ennobling in the thought that the human intellect apprehends God, and nothing out of Him, that He is the centre of all truth and science, pervading all human knowledge. How far removed is this system from groveling materialism and narrow-minded scepticism ! All, then, admit the charms of ontology. Indeed, these charms have attracted some of the ablest and noblest minds of modern times. But, while its adversaries admit its brilliancy, they deny its truth, and it is only right that we should now examine the arguments against it.

They say, in the first place, that this system is refuted by the testimony of conscience. Conscience should bear testimony to all the phenomena of the mind, and hence, if the intuition of God be an internal fact, conscience must make us

certain of its existence. But we may interrogate conscience forever on this point, yet it will be mute. It knows nothing of this ontological vision, and hence it must be rejected as the offspring of a fervid imagination, rather than the child of a logical head. This difficulty, however, is easily solved. For we deny that the intellectual vision of God belongs to the domain of conscience. Conscience tells us of the subjective modifications of the mind in the reflex state. But it neither tells us all our ideas nor all the facts in the mind. Nor can it enter the sanctuary of the soul in its direct state. It can not, especially, inform us of the presence of the infinite in our souls. For if it could, it would be infinite itself. The soul would have an infinite modification. It is reason that instructs us in the nature of the soul's direct state, and proves that we intue God's existence. When man shall have attained his last end after the reflex state of the soul has been fully

developed, and made equal to the direct state by man's becoming a participant of the Divine nature, then conscience will feel the presence of God in the mind. But here below, nothing short of a miracle can make us aware of God's presence in us, either in the natural or supernatural order. Nor does the fact that conscience tells us that the sensation of a creature's presence, or that an oral term, which is always finite, is always necessary to evoke the idea of the infinite, prove that we do not intue the infinite, or that the idea of the infinite is not prior to that of the finite in our mind. At most it shows the simultaneousness of the two ideas in our mind in the order of reflection—a fact which we do not deny, since the formula *ens creat existentias* supposes the three ideas of being, creation, and existences to be synchronologically in our mind. This formula gives us the ideal system in the direct state of the mind, as well as the real order which the objects

have to each other, the idea of being coming first. But in the order of reflection, since existences have two modes in which they may be apprehended—one as ideas in the creative act, and in this way they are perceived by God's intellect as well as by ours; the other as the causes or sensations, and in this way they are not apprehended by the intellect but felt by the senses—it follows that there is a great difference between ideal perception in the direct state and in the order of reflection. For while conscience has no part in the one it comes into the second. For conscience tells us about facts and never about ideas, unless in connection with facts. Hence, conscience plays the same *rôle* with regard to spiritual perceptions as the senses with regard to the apprehension of sensations. Just as the senses seem to tell us that the sun turns around us while the earth stands still, though it is *vice versa*; so conscience seems to assert that we only see creatures, while reason

teaches us that we see God. As conscience is the peculiar faculty which deals with what we feel, it is finite; for the predominating element in the order of reflection is the sensible, which is always finite. The intelligible, or God, must be inclosed, as it were, in a word, in order to be contemplated. But here there seems to be a contradiction. If the reflective act, because it is finite, can not perceive the intuition of God in our souls, how is it that reason, which is also finite in the intuitive act, apprehends the existence of God? The cases, however, are not similar. For the object of conscience is especially the finite, the sensible, the existing; while the object of reason is especially the infinite, the invisible, and the possible. How finite reason can intue an infinite object is a natural mystery included in the mystery of creation. We know it is a fact, without knowing its manner of existing; and, on the other hand, we know it is a fact that reflection or conscience does

not apprehend the infinite. And an inference drawn from the first case to the second would not be allowable. Yet, even in the reflective order, conscience seems to have some perception of the infinite. It knows what that idea is; we distinguish it from other ideas. And have we not often felt, when under the influence of some great passion, when beholding some vast prospect or moved by some great idea, as if the infinite touched our minds and warmed our hearts ? Just as saints have often felt the movements of grace or inspiration in the supernatural order. Have we not something in our conscience which tells us of the infinite abiding in our minds in a manner somewhat similar to that mysterious sentiment called by Gioberti the "faculty of super-intelligence," which in every natural man seems to admonish him of the existence of the supernatural ? It is hardly correct, then, to say that conscience is entirely mute with regard to our ideal perceptions of the infinite.

But it will be objected against this system, that in the order of reflection it destroys the idea of the infinite. For how can we have this idea except by means of language? But this infinite wrapped up in a word is not the infinite; for it is limited and circumscribed by its "involucrum," and hence, in the order of reflection, we can not have an idea of the infinite. Hence the ontologists are in the same condition as the partisans of the other systems which we have been refuting.

But we answer, that, in the order of reflection, we have not the idea of the infinite in its perfection or in its integrity. We see it obscurely, as the eye sees the sun partially hidden by the clouds. What we see in the word is but a ray emanating from it. Conscience becomes aware of its presence in the mind by the sensible form or sign, while the intellect is enlightened by this ray of light from God, and mounts by its aid right to the centre from which it has gone forth. We proved

by reason that in the direct state of our soul there must be the idea of the infinite in its integrity ; but in the order of reflection our intellect can not grasp the whole of this idea at the same time. Every man's intellect is illuminated by the infinite. But no human intellect in this life is able to bear the full blaze of infinite majesty. As the rays of the sun coming into a darkened chamber give light to the objects in it, and are connected with the sun itself and emanate directly from it, so that we may say it is the sun that dispels the darkness ; so it is with God's intellectual light beaming on the human intellect and enlightening every man that comes into the world.

Another great objection against this system is, that it tends to pantheism. In this regard the example of Gioberti is cited, who, toward the end of his career, is said to have become a pantheist, and to have written a letter to Young Italy, in which the following expression occurs :

“I hold that pantheism is the only true and solid philosophy.” The authenticity of this letter, however, has never been sufficiently proved. It is probably a forgery of the Mazzinian faction. But as a special dissertation will be given by us on pantheism in another part of the treatise, and as we shall then see that ontologism alone satisfactorily refutes that error in its various forms, we need now say no more of this difficulty.

It is also objected against Gioberti’s system, that it is not necessary that there should be an identity of relation between the logical and ontological order. Let us, then, show the truth of this assertion. The ontological order is the order of things as they are ; the logical order is the order of things as they are apprehended by the mind. Now, in the first place, there is no reason why the mind should not apprehend things as they are, and hence there is no reason why the logical and ontological order should not be the

same. In the second place, there is a reason why they should be the same. For if the logical order be not the same as the ontological, the mind will not apprehend things as they are ; and if it does not apprehend them as they are, it will not apprehend them truly, and it will not apprehend truths which would be contrary to the nature of the mind. There is truth in our mind subjectively considered because there is conformity with the object ; and where this conformity does not exist, there is error. Now, in the ontological order, God is first and creatures second. Hence, in the logical order, the mind must apprehend God first and creatures second. For if it apprehended creature first and God second, it would not apprehend things as they are, it would not apprehend truth. Hence, however much we may condemn Gioberti personally, we can not help admitting his philosophical system.

QUESTION EIGHTH.

DOES THE INTELLECT APPREHEND CONTINGENT FACTS?

WE have thus far seen that the idea of God is intelligible in itself. Let us see if creatures be intelligible in themselves. In other words, does the mind apprehend the individual in itself? To this St. Thomas answers, “*No.*” For he denies that material individuals are intelligible in themselves. We are glad, then, to be able to join hands with the disciples of the Angelic Doctor in establishing the opinion, that finite or contingent facts are not the object of thought. Those who defend the intelligibility of finite or contingent facts might do so either by maintaining that nothing but the contingent or finite

facts are apprehended by the mind, or that they are perceived together with the infinite and their types or possibilities. But neither of these hypotheses can be maintained. In order that the object of thought should be wholly in the contingent, two conditions must be fulfilled. Firstly, that the contingent should be capable of immediately terminating our thoughts. Secondly, it should include in itself whatever we apprehend by thought. But the contingent fulfills neither of these two conditions. It does not terminate the mind by itself, because it is contingent, and being contingent, it must have a cause prior to itself, and therefore the idea of cause goes before it, and is the condition *sine qua non* of its apprehension.

Nor do contingent facts include in themselves every thing we apprehend by thought. For beside the contingent, we have an idea of the necessary, and beside the finite we have an idea of the infinite.

Now, neither the infinite nor the necessary can be contained in the finite and contingent. Hence the finite and contingent can not be said to be the only object apprehended by the mind.

The hypothesis that the objectivity of ideas is partially made up of contingent facts is equally absurd. For that can be in no sense the object of thought which can not at all terminate our intellect. But such are contingent beings, whose existence, indeed, we can feel by means of sensations, but never apprehend as ideas. For they have no essential connection with our perceptions. The object of thought is essential to every perception, and if there be any object which we can perceive as unnecessary to intellectual perception, it is no longer the object of thought. But every finite existence may be conceived as not existing, and we can conceive God as producing all the impressions made on our minds by physical existences, even though they

did not exist ; hence their existence has no essential connection with our perception. In fact, if this connection between the finite object of our perception existed, it would either exist always, so that we could think of no creature which would not be at the same time existing ; or this connection would only exist in certain circumstances — that is to say, in what we call external perceptions. But this connection between our perception and the finite object exists in neither of these two cases. To show the first, we have only to cite the case of a dreamer or madman, who may have many finite ideas, or rather sensations of the finite, without their having any connection with existing finite realities ; and to show the second, we have only to say that circumstances can not change the essence of any thing, and hence if the connection between the perception and finite existence be sometimes wanting, the finite can not be intelligible in itself, nor in any sense be the

object of thought. Hence, finite or contingent facts are not intelligible in themselves or as individuals, but only in their types or species, which are in God. In themselves, however, they are felt; we become certain of their existence by means of sensations. All ideas are therefore different aspects of the divinity viewed by the intellect, and hence they constitute the intelligible part of thought, the object of our intellectual perceptions. But ideas, perceptions, sensations, and facts have a real relation to each other; for every idea implies a possible fact, and every fact implies a real idea, for facts are but the individualization or actuation of ideas. And all sensations are the subjective modifications of the mind produced by facts, and they give us the sensible elements of thought. By ideas we arrive at the knowledge of the existence of God and of the possibility of creation, and by sensations we are made certain of the fact

of our own existence and of the existence of other created things.

But it may be asked, if contingent facts are not apprehended by the intellect as ideas, how can it be certain of their existence? Since the intellect is the seat of certitude, every thing that is certain must have a relation to it. To this question we answer, that contingent facts have a relation to the intellect, though they be not apprehended by it in themselves. All the faculties of the mind are connected; for the mind is a simple substance, and hence nothing can affect one of these faculties without affecting at the same time all the others. Yet the modifications and the acts of one faculty have not the same relations to all the other faculties, for each faculty has its peculiarities and its idiosyncrasies. Hence the will can not be separated from the intellect, nor the intellect from the will, etc., though the acts of the will are not formally the same as the acts of the intellect, and the

same may be said of the acts of the imagination and the memory. Hence sensations by which we become certain of the existence of the finite or contingent facts have relation with the intellect; but the manner in which sense acts upon the reason, as well as the manner in which one faculty relates to another, is a psychological mystery impervious to reason. Mysteries of this kind are common in every order. In fact, the last reason of every thing is a mystery. We know, with regard to finite or contingent facts, that our senses apprehend them, and we feel an invincible propensity in our nature to believe the testimony of those senses. This propensity is called common-sense, the second in the order of the motives of certitude, evidence being the first. Now, evidence is peculiarly the certitude of pure intellect, and hence, just as common-sense, the principal element of which is sensation or the sensible of thought, is based upon evidence, the

principal element of which is idea or the intelligible of thought; so sensation depends upon idea or reason, which is properly the mistress of the mind, whom all the other faculties must obey. Hence we see that the intellect may be certain of the existence of finite or contingent facts, though it does not apprehend them ideally.

QUESTION NINTH.

WHAT IS MEANT BY THE HISTORY AND SOLUTION OF THE CONTROVERSY CONCERNING THE UNIVERSALS ?

KIND, *species*, *difference*, *property*, (proprium,) and *accident*, are called the universals. It is certain that the ideas suggested by those words are distinct from the idea of individualities. Thus, when I think of man, the object which I represent to myself is not any particular individual, as James or John, but something which is common to all of those individuals, and consequently belongs to none of them exclusively. The question for us to treat is, are those five universals mere names, or do they indicate realities ? This question

gave rise to many quarrels in the middle ages, when intellectual tilts were almost as common and as esteemed as knightly tournaments.

There were three great schools holding different opinions with regard to the nature of universals. These were called the Nominalists, the Conceptualists, and the Realists. Roscelin, a French canon of the eleventh century, denied the objective reality of the universals. According to him, a universal was but a name, a word indicative of no reality, but used to designate a collection of individuals. Hence his system was called Nominalism. He acknowledged no reality but that of individuals.

The second system was called Conceptualism, invented in the twelfth century by Abelard. According to him, universal ideas are not mere names or empty sounds, nor yet objective realities. But they are *intellectual conceptions*—*mental realities*—which our intellect forms by

means of abstraction—that is to say, by noting the difference and comparing the relations between *individuals*. But this system differs from Nominalism only in name. For when the Nominalists say that the universals are mere sounds, they do not suppose that the mind does not understand their sense. But as the mind can not understand the sense of any thing without having a conception of it, the Nominalists must admit the universals to be conceptions of the mind. In fact the difficulty between the Nominalists and the Realists does not lie in this point, but in the objectivity to be given to the universals, outside of the mind. Therefore Nominalism and Conceptualism agree in substance.

Realism is directly opposed to Nominalism. It maintains that universals have a real objectivity "*a parte rei*." The principal defenders of this system were St. Anselm in the eleventh century, William Champeaux in the twelfth, and

Scotus in the fourteenth. All the Realists agree in one point, namely, that the universals have reality, but they disagree in explaining its nature. Some say, with the Nominalists, that there is no reality which is not *an* individual. Yet they admit a kind of reality for the universals. They say that there are many respects in which each individual might be considered. For instance, in the essence of each individual we find something which makes it similar to others of its species, and something which makes it unlike all other individuals. The former property they called its species, and the latter its difference. The *difference* is indivisible, but the species is by nature multiple, for it may be found in several individuals, and hence it is called a universal. To illustrate this, let us take a scholastic example: *Socratis*, in Socrates, indicates the individual Socrates. But *humanitas* designates something which Socrates has in common with all men,

and hence it is the universal or species, while the other is the individual. Other Realists consider universals as realities entirely distinct from individuals, so that, for instance, though no human individual should exist, still *humanitas* would have its reality. But these Realists disagree again upon the nature of this reality, as well as with regard to the manner in which individuals are distinguished from the species as well as from each other.

Some make the reality of the universals a distinct, uncreated, and independent existence, and they interpret Plato's theory of ideas in this sense. Others, in giving them a distinct existence, say they were created by God; while others again identify the universals with the eternal archetypes of things contained in the essence of God, which is creation's model. There are also several opinions as to what constitutes and distinguishes individuals. According to some, individuality is but a mere accident, which, being

added to the universal, constitutes the individual.

Others, with Scotus, admit a universal reality found in all individuals, and called *haecceitas*, which distinguishes one individual from another, as well as from the species. Having thus explained the different systems regarding the nature of universals, we shall now examine doctrinally the three following questions: Firstly: Are the universals objective realities, or mere conceptions of the mind? Secondly: Are they distinct from mere individuals and independent of them in their being? Thirdly: What is their nature? In answer to the first question we assert that universals are objective realities. In order to prove this assertion, three things are necessary to be made evident, namely, Firstly: That we can have no intellectual conception which has not an object. Secondly: That we can have an intellectual conception of the universals. Thirdly: That this concep-

tion has its foundation *only* in objective reality. That there can be no thought in our mind which does not imply an object is a principle included in the very nature of intellectual conception, as we have already shown. Besides, there is no necessity of proving what is admitted by our adversaries, who do not deny that conceptions imply an object, but deny that this object is a universal reality.

As to the question whether we have a conception of the universals or not, Abelard himself, as well as the Nominalists, admits that we think of kinds and species, and hence we have ideas of them. Finally, that the reality of the universals is objective and self-existing can be easily proved ; for in this respect nothing can exist in itself but universals and individuals. Now if it be denied that the universals have realities in themselves, their realities must be taken from individuals by means of mental abstraction. In fact,

this is what the Nominalists and Conceptualists assert. But this can not be said; for then it would follow that we should have an idea of the individual before that of the species to which it belongs. Yet in order to conceive an individual as such, it is necessary that we should conceive it by that note or characteristic which makes it an individual of such a nature, rather than of such another; that is to say, with the scholastics, the "*Quidditas rei*." Thus, before we conceive the individual Peter, it is first necessary that we should have the idea of man—the species of which he is a member. For if we have not the idea of man, we could not assert that he was such or such a man. But this *quiddity* or *essence* is the universal or species, which may be participable by an indefinite number of individuals. Therefore we have the idea of the universal before we conceive the idea of the individual. But even if we admit the priority

of the conception of the individual to that of the species, still the hypothesis of our adversaries would not hold good. For in order that the mind should obtain one idea from another by means of mental abstraction, it is necessary that the latter should have a greater extension than the former; for the greater can not be contained in the less. But the universal is greater than the individual, and therefore the universal can not be derived from the individual by any kind of abstraction. And hence the universals are objective realities.

Are the universals constituted in their realities independent of individuals? We answer affirmatively. If not, we should have to say, with a certain class of Realists, that they are nothing else than those properties which are possessed in common by several individuals. But this assertion can by no means be maintained. For it makes the individual contain the universal. The universal

would be an integral part of the individual, and concur in its formation. But as the individual can contain nothing which is not individual without losing its nature, we can not suppose it to contain the universal without becoming a universal instead of an individual. Besides, when our adversaries say that the universal is part of the individual, they must mean either that the universal is a reality, found the same in all individuals, or in the relation of similitude among individuals by means of different aspects, which make them similar without being identical.

But in neither sense can the universals be said to be in the individuals. For in the first case the universal should pertain no more to one individual than to another, and hence no individual could claim the universal, and therefore the universal would be independent of individuals for its reality. For instance, let us suppose that humanity is identical in

two individuals, A and B. Since the individuality is that which constitutes A distinct from B, humanity must be distinguished from the individuality of each. But in this case individuality can be conceived only as an accident which may affect the same essence differently; and humanity, which is the universal, will be independent in its reality of all individuals. Nor can it be said that universals are contained in the individuals in the second manner; for several individuals can not be similar to each other in any respect, without being in that respect, individualizations of the same universal distinct from each of them. Thus, I can not say that A and B are similar in any respect to humanity, without conceiving a certain archetype, of which each of them is an exact copy, and yet from which each of them is distinct. And hence the universals are in no sense either constitutive or accidental parts of individuals.

Besides, universals are absolute and necessary, while individuals are relative and contingent. But the absolute and necessary do not depend upon the contingent for their reality, since the absolute and necessary would have their reality although neither relative nor contingent should exist. However, though the universals do not depend upon individuals for their reality, they nevertheless always imply at least possible individuals. For two things may be considered in them, namely, either the degree of being which makes them perceptible to the mind ; or their participability by an indefinite number of individuals. Only in this latter respect are they called universals. Thus, the uniyersal humanity is conceived as participable by an indefinite number of individual men ; hence the conception of the universal always implies the conception of the individual. All that we maintain is, that universals would be real if there never were any

individuals; so that the reality of the universal does not depend on the individual; though the universal and individual, being correlative terms, can never be conceived one without the other.

We assert, in the third place, that universals, considered in themselves, are nothing else than the archetypes of all things, contained from all eternity in the essence of God. In order to prove this, three facts must be established. Firstly, that archetypes of things must be admitted in God; secondly, that those archetypes fulfill the conditions necessary to make them identical with the universals; thirdly, that nothing else can fulfill those conditions. In the first place, the archetypes of things are in God; for God must have a knowledge of possible things, and this knowledge must be terminated by reality. Moreover, as this knowledge is essential and necessary, the reality which terminates must have the same qualities, and must exist in God; otherwise a

necessary reality could exist outside of God, which is absurd.

Secondly, those archetypes fulfill the conditions necessary to make them identical with the universals; for these conditions are three, namely, the archetypes must be something real; must be constituted independently of individuals; and participable by an indefinite number of individuals. But they are real since they are the object of the divine knowledge, and the term of the divine intellect must be a reality. They are constituted independently of individuals, for the archetypes of things would exist even if no individuals were ever created. This fact is implied in their conception. Thirdly and lastly, they are conceived as participable by an indefinite number of individuals; for they are the common exemplars which God imitates in the production of individuals, and they are conceived as inexhaustible.

Thirdly, nothing else but these archetypal

types can fulfill those conditions ; for if there be given such reality, it must be either uncreated and necessary according to Plato's theory, and distinct from God ; or it should be a created reality. But there can be no such thing as an uncreated reality distinct from God ; and if we make this supposed reality a creature, it must be identified with contingent individuals ; which is absurd, as we have already shown. Hence universals are nothing else but the archetypes of things in the essence of God.

QUESTION TENTH.

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE DIRECT AND REFLEX STATE OF THE SOUL?

HE soul is said to be in the reflex state when it can analyze thoughts and distinguish objects from each other. Our soul is now in that state. But we know that this is not its primitive state. We know that we have come to this state successively, acquiring knowledge bit by bit. The further we go toward our childhood, the less we find in it of our knowledge; and we finally arrive at a period where our knowledge seems to begin, beyond which we can remember nothing. Besides, we know from experience that our knowledge has been obtained by the influence which

external objects have exerted on our mind and by education. Hence, we conclude that the actual state of our mind is not primitive; is not that which was from the beginning, for we are certain that our mind existed before the existence of memory. What then was the state of the mind before the reflex state? We call this primitive state of the mind the direct state. As to its nature philosophers disagree. Some say the mind before reflection was a blank, something like a clean slab of marble without mark or letter, on which external objects inscribed their names one after the other. In short, the mind was a "tabula rasa."

But we reject this materialistic opinion. For the mind was never a blank. It is essentially a thinking substance. It has now the power of thought, and this power constitutes its essence. And as the essence of being is unchangeable, the mind always possessed the power of thought even in its primitive state. But as the

power in this case essentially implies the act, the mind actually thinks, and has ever actually thought. Thought, therefore, has ever been in the mind, and hence the mind has never been a blank.

Another school admits that the mind had thought in this primitive state, but denies that this thought had any other element than a sensible one. But this too we must reject; for as the essence of thought never varies, and as this essence implies an intelligible as well as a sensible element, the hypothesis of the merely *sensible* thought must be rejected.

In what way then was thought in the mind in the direct state? We answer it was there in synthesis. Experience teaches us that we arrive at distinct notions by analyzing the elements of some object which at first presented itself to us synthetically, and yet by this analysis we do not acquire new but distinct knowledge. Thus, a man looking at a vast landscape apprehends the whole view at

once. He seizes it, as it were, in synthesis. But it is only by analyzing it that he acquires a distinct perception of its natural phenomena. Yet he acquires no really new knowledge by this analysis. Again, when a professor of mathematics defines a circle to the tyro in geometry, the student apprehends all its properties in the synthesis of the definition. He may afterward analyze these properties and acquire greater distinctness of knowledge. Yet he has acquired nothing positively new, since all is contained in the definition.

In this primitive state, therefore, the ideal formula, "Ens creat existentias," is in the mind synthetically, and, as we advance in years, by analyzing this synthesis we obtain reflex knowledge. In this first state the intellect has the simple intuition of God. The will was a pure adhesion to good. The mind in this period of its existence is in a state of involution; it gradually evolves its faculties. It con-

tinues to evolve them through life, and happiness for the soul consists in the perfect evolution of all its faculties. So that the happiness of the soul may be philosophically defined to be the complete evolution of the synthesis of the direct state. This hypothesis is very simple, and might be received. It implies no repugnances ; there is nothing absurd in it ; besides, it explains perfectly the soul's nature at the same time that it preserves its dignity better than other systems. It is, moreover, in accordance with analogy ; for certainly experience teaches us that the soul evolves its faculties and acquires greater knowledge with its years ; and it seems to be a law of nature that all created things should thus evolve their latent energies. The germ contains the plant. The oak has its direct state in the acorn, and as things can not change their essence without losing their identity, we can not admit any system which would add in the course of time an essential attribute

to a being which it had not from the very first instant of its creation. The essential elements of thought have therefore been ever in the mind; and hence it does not change its nature but only its manner of existing when it passes from the direct to the reflex state.

QUESTION ELEVENTH.

DOES GOD EXIST?

HE arguments which are derived from the mere consideration of our ideas, to prove the existence of God, are called metaphysical arguments. They are three in number: *Intuitive*, *Deductive à priori*, and *Deductive à posteriori*; they are the basis of all other arguments which prove God's existence; and they are the only arguments that can not be disputed. We consider, firstly, the Intuitive. We derive this argument from the mere fact of our apprehension of God without ratiocination. From this mere fact of intuition we prove the existence of God. We intue God existing, and therefore we say He exists.

This argument is the strongest on account of its clearness. We will explain. In the first place, we have an idea of God; secondly, this idea is the idea of God existing; thirdly, our idea can not give us God existing, if he does not exist. We know that we have an idea of God, because we know what is meant by the word God; we distinguish this from others. Secondly, this idea is the idea of God existing. Existence is being in act; possibility is nothing in itself, but is something in the cause which brings the possibility into the state of act. Hence our ideas are always realities; for, whether they have for their object existing reality or possible reality, the groundwork is always something real. Now, the idea of God is not the idea of a possibility, for the idea of God is the idea of a simple being, of supreme and infinite being. But infinite, supreme, and simple being exists in itself, and is not merely in the order of potentiality; for, granting for a

moment that such being were possible in another being, so that this other being would be its cause, this cause would exist, and it would be this existing cause that we would see in contemplating simple, infinite, and supreme being. Hence in any case the idea of God would be the idea of an existing reality. Thirdly, our ideas can not give us God existing if He does not exist; for perception is intuition—intuition supposes something intued. Now the object intued must be as it is seen to be. Now as our intuition in the case of God, gives us God existing, God must really exist, otherwise it would be false that we have an idea of him. Therefore, from the simple fact that we have an idea of God, we lawfully conclude that God exists.

From this argument we may learn the difference between simple, infinite, and supreme being, and the ideas of finite being. From the fact that we have the idea of some finite being present to the mind, it

follows that this being is possible; but not that it exists in itself, but that it exists in the infinite being which is the archetype of all contingent being. But simple, supreme, and infinite being, or rather its idea, can be contained in nothing else than in itself; it has no archetype, and hence it is conceived by itself, and exists by the fact that it is conceived as existing.

SECOND ARGUMENT.

We have what is called deduction in the demonstration of every judgment when the two terms are shown by means of a third to express identical or subordinate notions. This deduction takes place *à priori*, when the truth of the premises logically precedes, or at least does not presuppose the truth of the conclusion. Since, therefore, besides the essence of God, nothing can be conceived which does not presuppose the truth that God exists, the argument thus exposed by us now consists in showing, from the

essence of God, that his existence must be included in his essence. Now, whether we consider God's essence either as simple, infinite, or supreme being, we must conclude that he exists. For what is existence? It is a mode of being. But simple being, that is, which is all being, being by essence, and out of which there is no being, must have all modes of being, therefore, it must have the mode of existence; for if it had not, it would be only a partial being, or an "*ens secundum quid*," which implies a contradiction in terms. It would be saying that *ens simpliciter* was at the same time only *ens secundum quid*. Secondly, we conceive God's essence as infinite, therefore he exists by essence, for existence is something real and positive; it is a perfection; it means more than its opposite—possibility. Hence a being without existence has nothing positive in itself; but that which has nothing positive, is limited in its being, and hence is not infinite. Hence,

though all being with existence is not infinite, infinite being must have existence. Thirdly, God is the supreme being. But the essence of the supreme being essentially implies its existence; for supreme being expresses a mode of being which places the being that possesses it above all other beings, no matter what may be their nature; but a being not existing by essence is not supreme or above all other beings; hence supreme being must have existence by its very nature and essence.

THIRD ARGUMENT.

This argument proves the existence of God from the idea of the essence of beings distinct from God. The fact that God exists is shown from premises in which it is contained as the reason of their truth. Thus we formulate it: That being exists, without whose existence other beings would neither exist, be possible, or even intelligible. But such a being is God. To prove it, it is only necessary to show

that the hypothesis is absurd which would suppose beings conceived by us as possessing existence, possibility, and intelligibility, and, at the same time, not possessing existence, possibility, or intelligibility; such an hypothesis may be shown to be absurd intuitively and deductively. Intuitively, for by the fact that those beings are apprehended by us, they must have some reality outside of the mind either in themselves or in a cause which has the power of creating them, which is their intelligible archetype, and which renders them apprehensible by the mind; deductively, for, by the fact that those beings are beings, they must be distinguished from nonentity, or nothing; for it would imply a contradiction to say that a being was at the same time being and nonentity. But if those beings had no existence, possibility, or intelligibility, they would be nothing. Yet if God does not exist, the above absurd hypothesis would be true; for without God's exist-

ence no other being could exist. God is simple, infinite, and supreme being; other beings are finite, partial, and subordinate. But if simple, infinite, and supreme being do not exist, how can the others exist, for they are only participants of it? They would not be possible; possibility means existence in a cause which has the power of reducing beings to act; but if this cause do not exist, there is no producing cause. Hence finite, subordinate, and limited beings would not be possible; neither would they be intelligible without the existence of God. Intelligibility means the capacity of a being to be apprehended by the mind, either in itself or in another being. Now finite, subordinate, and secundum quid beings are not intelligible in themselves, but in their cause—God. Hence, as we have shown elsewhere, without the existence of God, finite, subordinate, and secundum quid beings would be unintelligible, impossible, and could not exist.

QUESTION TWELFTH.

IS GOD'S EXISTENCE IDENTIFIED WITH THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER BEINGS?

HE great philosophical heresy of the age is Pantheism. In every nation in which it has grown up in modern times it has produced the wildest theories regarding religion, civil government, and morality. Its effects are manifested in the literature as well as in the political revolutions of the age. It has infected not only the minds of philosophers, but even of historians, poets, legislators, statesmen, and even novelists. Its theories have been propagated even among the masses, and, actuated by its influence, they have risen up in rebellion against all law, human and divine. We assert facts

which prove how false it is to assume that merely speculative or metaphysical theories exercise no influence over the minds of men. Most of the philosophers of Germany, as Hegel, Fichte, and Schelling —many in France, among others Victor Cousin, were, or are, all pantheists. The principal leaders of the revolution in 1848, and the ruling spirits of the present movement in Italy belong to the same school. The fruits of pantheism have been socialism, Fourierism, philanthropism, radicalism, and communism. As the system of philosophy which we have thus far been maintaining, has been charged with pantheistic tendencies, we shall now see that perhaps this modern error can be better refuted from an ontological standpoint than from any other. Besides the essence of God there are other essences which exist or may exist; and the question to be solved between the pantheists and us, is, whether the existence of those essences is identified with that of God or

not. The pantheists assert that God alone exists, and that, as he is infinite, nothing positive, no individual existence is distinguished from his. It is true we have the ideas of the finite multiple and of creation, which would imply terms distinct from the Creator. But these are either illusions of the imagination, or internal evolutions and manifestations of God himself, who, though always remaining the same, one, infinite, and uncreated, limits, multiplies, and creates himself phenomenally. This is the marrow of pantheism.

There are different schools of pantheists; different ways of explaining their system. The three great pantheistical schools are called Emanatism, Formalism, and Idealism. According to the first system God existed as a complete and independent person when he desired to manifest himself in creation. But creation is not a production of being out of nothing, but a communication of the Cre-

ator's being in a finite manner. By means of this communication new individuals are begotten having distinct personal life in God. Their substance is the substance of God which they possess in a finite manner, while God has it in an infinite degree.

Hence, in the unity of the divine substance, there are several terms each of which is constituted by a determinate particle, and the divine substance is conscious of its existence in as many different ways as there are terms of this character. But this distinction of persons in God will cease; for creatures will return to their pristine unity by complete absorption in the divine personality. Creation will return to its source in this way. Therefore creation is like a stream going out from the sea, but returning again to its source after traversing various regions. It is in this manner that the humanitarian school of pantheists explain the identification of the world with God.

The second school of pantheists is that of the formalists. This school does not admit even a personal distinction between God and other beings. God is not an individual being endowed either with the faculty of understanding or of loving. He is infinite, and for this reason can not be a distinct individuality; for every individual is limited as such, and hence not infinite. God is therefore a force everywhere diffused, and determined by no limits. This force constitutes the reality of all individuals conceived by us. But in itself considered, independently of individuals, it is but a mere abstraction without reality. Hence, the various created beings, inasmuch as they partake of this force, are identical. But they are at the same time distinct from each other as ideal forms or modifications which this force is ever producing by an intrinsic necessity of its nature. There are two kinds of forms in which the divine being manifests itself—thought and extension.

The first makes human minds and other spiritual substances. The second constitutes bodies. This is the sum of Spinoza's system.

We see that the formalists do not perfectly identify all things with God, since they admit at least a formal distinction among beings. But the *idealists*, in order to make all things perfectly identical, deny this formal distinction. They maintain that nothing exists in reality either as forms or as individuals, but that all ideas are mere abstractions, or different modes in which being is successively apprehended by us. Nothing exists or can exist, though we have the idea of being without any distinct form, undetermined, neither finite nor infinite, neither matter nor spirit, neither one nor many. Hence, this being is nothing in itself. Hence, there is no created being, but being is ever being created, no being is *in factu esse*, but all is *in to fieri*. Hence all science consists in asserting that

nothing is. This system is called Idealism.

We shall now begin to refute those systems, and we shall commence with idealism, for a reason that will manifest itself as we proceed. We must prove, therefore, firstly, that real ideal distinctions must be admitted in being, and, consequently, that the universal identity of idealism is false. Secondly, that these distinct terms are not mere forms of the same personality, but distinct persons or individuals, and hence, that formalism is wrong; and thirdly, that these distinct individuals can not exist in the same substance, but that they imply a plurality of substances and the consequent rejection of emanatism. Thus we refute the three systems inversely.

FIRST PROPOSITION.

Real distinctions must be admitted in being objectively considered, and hence the system of the idealists is refuted. To

prove this assertion we have only to observe that if our intellect sees real distinctions they must at least exist subjectively, and so must have objective distinctions corresponding to them. Now, it is clear that there are such subjective distinctions. The idealists themselves admit it, and besides conscience informs us of the fact. For there are real distinctions where there are several terms so distinct from each other that they can not be confounded without contradiction. Many such terms are found in the subjective order. In the very fact of thought we have the subject and object distinct, which we can not identify without destroying the possibility of a relation between them. Again, the subject of thought has consciousness of itself as a finite being, that is to say a being which derives its existence from another. But principle or cause of existence, and its term can not be confounded without contradiction. Another proof may be taken from the fact that the object

of thought is varied in term in such a way that one term by its very nature prevents identity with another. Thus, for instance, the terms finite and infinite, or necessary and contingent. Hence, real distinctions in being must be admitted at least in the subjective order. We furthermore assert that these subjective distinctions imply real objective distinctions; for objective being is that which terminates our intellect or what our intellect apprehends in thinking. Hence, things must be objectively as we apprehend them subjectively; otherwise the same thing would be and would not be at the same time. For if the real distinctions which we conceive subjectively had no corresponding objective reality, we should be obliged to admit one of two hypotheses—either that what we conceive has no reality out of our mind, and that it is consequently identified with absolute nothingness, or that it is the mere indeterminate being which the idealists make it.

But neither of these hypotheses can be maintained. The first would lead us into nihilism, than which nothing can be conceived more absurd or contradictory. And the second is equally absurd, for either our mind apprehends things as they are or it does not. If it apprehends things as they are, they have all the reality which we apprehend; and if it does not, we can affirm nothing of them, not even indeterminate being, for every affirmation has its foundation in the truth of our mental apprehension. Besides, indeterminate being is a mere abstraction having no reality. For every thing that exists is determined in some way or other. The idealists, therefore, can not avoid nihilism. They can not get out of it by saying that there is a difference between absolute nothing and "*Ens in fieri*," for that which is nothing can not be possible or *in fieri*. But it may be objected that unless we admit the hypothesis of the idealists we fall into a manifest contradic-

tion by supposing the object of the intellect to be at the same time finite and infinite, contingent and necessary, material and spiritual, relative and absolute. For the object of thought presents itself to our mind under these different aspects. But we answer that those different ideas do not present the same being formally considered. The real object of thought is infinite being, and presents itself to us as possessing infinite attributes. But with this idea of the infinite we perceive the possible existence of other beings distinct in character and attributes from infinite being, yet dependent on it as their cause and creator. Consequently the difficulty does not hold, and the system of the idealists is refuted.

SECOND PROPOSITION.

The real distinctions which must be admitted in objective being imply the possibility or existence of beings distinct from God, at least in their personal life, and

consequently, the personal identity of all things in the sense of the formalists must be rejected. Here we assert two things. First, that God has personal life; and second, that there are other beings which either actually or potentially do not belong to this personal life. To have personal life three things are necessary, namely, First, that there be a substance in act. Second, that this substance be not subject to another as to its term of imputability. Third, that this same substance be conscious of its own power and say "*I.*" But God has these three qualities. For, in the first place, he exists, and is, consequently, a substance in act. He does not depend on any other substance as the term of his imputability, otherwise he would not be infinite or supreme being. And in the third place, he has perfect consciousness of himself; for that which is infinite must have an intellect; must be capable of being understood and of being loved; and as in infinite

being there is all good and all truth, there must be consciousness of the possession of those perfections. Otherwise there would be something wanting in the infinite, and this we know can not be, for that which is infinite has no defects. Therefore in God there is personal life. The second thing to prove is, that there are beings actually or potentially existing, yet not belonging to the personal life of God. For we apprehend, both subjectively and objectively, finite beings as well as the infinite. We are conscious of their existence subjectively, for we are aware that our existence is limited; and objectively, we conceive the possibility of limitation in being. Now, beings of this kind can not be in the personal life of God; for if they were, their union with this personal life could be explained only in one of two ways. They would either be constitutive parts of his life, so that his life could not be conceived without them, or God by a free act would unite

them to his life, and make them participate in his nature. Now, the first mode of existence is impossible. For according to this hypothesis the idea of God would necessarily be connected with the idea of finite beings. Nor could we then conceive God as absolutely distinct from other beings. For a being can not be conceived independent of its constitutive parts. But God is complete in his essence without relation to finite objects, and his idea logically precedes the idea of finite beings, and consequently these finite beings can not be constitutive parts of God's personal life. Besides, the personal life of God is infinite and can not be made up of finite parts; for that which is made up of finite parts is limited, and that which is limited is not infinite. As to the *second hypothesis*, it is possible; indeed, we know by faith that such a union actually does take place in the mystery of the Incarnation. But such a union is a gift. It is not something that

happens by the nature of things. It is effected by a free act of the Infinite.

But it may be said by the formalists that finite beings pertain to the personal life of God as forms or determinations or mere manifestations of this life.

This, however, is equally objectionable ; for, by the fact that they are conceived as distinct beings, they are distinct individuals, and have distinct personal life of their own. Now, that which has personal life of its own can not be a mere form, determination, or manifestation of the personal life of another ; consequently the proposition as it has been enunciated is true in every particular.

THIRD PROPOSITION.

Beings distinct from God in their personal life must be distinct from him in substance, and hence the substantial identity of the emanatists must be rejected.

The difference between substance and

person is that the former is the support of the latter. Personal life is the act of determination of a substance conscious of itself, and whose acts are not imputable to another. And substance is the very force which is put in act, or rather whose act is constituted by the peculiar determination called personal life. We shall, therefore, prove our assertion if we show that the same active force which is the subject of the infinite act, which constitutes God's personal life, can not be at the same time the subject of the finite acts which constitute the personal life of beings distinct from God. For the contrary of this assertion could only happen in one of two ways—either by the division of this infinite force, or by its undivided co-possession. In the first case, the substances of the beings distinct from the divine act would be so many parts of the active force which constitutes the personal life of God. These parts would be contained at first indis-

tinctly in the infinite force, so that they would form only one substance; and the production of finite beings would consist in God's taking away one or more of these parts, by a division of his substance, from his own act, and giving it a new determination, and, consequently, distinct life. Thus, as the emanatists say, creatures would come from God like the web from a spider, or the thread from a silkworm. In the other way, that is to say by co-possession, the divine substance remaining undivided, would be at the same time the substance of finite beings. In this case, to have other beings created, nothing is required but the production of new determinations in the active force which makes the personal life of God. By means of these determinations the substance of God, at the same time that it retains its own act, is terminated by other acts, and as it were co-possessed. Hence in creation something would happen similar to what takes place eternally

in God, where the undivided substance of the deity is co-possessed by three distinct persons. But neither of these two modes of explaining the system of the emanatists can stand the test of truth. For the first mode supposes two absurdities. Firstly, that the undivided divine act has a divisible substance under it. Secondly, that parts may be taken from this substance to be the subject of new determinations. Now wherever there is divisibility there is multiplicity; and as the act of God is supposed to be divisible, his substance must be multiple also, and there must be multiplicity of acts. Act is the determination of substance, or rather it is substance itself determined. Hence a determination is nothing real out of the force which underlies it. Consequently where this force is found multiple, the determinations of it must also be multiple. It is, therefore, repugnant that one act, or determination in existence, should be supported by many active

forces instead of one. Consequently the first hypothesis falls to the ground. Nor can the second be better defended; for if the divine act, or existence, could lose any part of its substance, it would be possible to separate an active force from its actual *state*, or determination in existence, and the force itself would be something independently real and concrete. But this consequence is opposed to the true notion of substance; for just as there is no existing determination without a substance, so there is no substance without a determination. Besides, in this hypothesis, God could lose some of his being, which is contrary to the notions we have of his infinity and immutability. The other hypothesis is equally erroneous, namely, that the active force of God remaining undivided could, at the same time, constitute the active force of other beings by co-possession. For the determination of any active force does not differ from its exercise; indeed, it is this

force itself manifesting itself in act. Now if this be true, either the force of God would be completely expended in each of the finite beings which would co-possess it, or it would be completely expended in none of them, but in their collection; or finally, it would be completely expended in one of these, and incompletely in others. But each of these three hypotheses is absurd. In the first place, there is no difference between one complete manifestation of a force and another; is it not, therefore, a contradiction of terms to suppose at the same time several complete manifestations of the same force in different beings? Besides, in the first hypothesis, each of these manifestations would be God, which is another absurdity. And if the second hypothesis be maintained, each of the manifestations would be finite; and hence God as infinite being will be supposed without personal life, since a finite manifestation can not express infinite personal life

Moreover, this hypothesis would make us admit multiplicity of parts in God. For if there be several existences or beings in act, different in their nature and independent of each other, they can not be manifestations of the same force, but of different forces. The same distinction that exists among them must exist among their forces. Nor is the third supposition more tenable than the other two, namely, that it would manifest itself completely in one and incompletely in another. For there is a contradiction in supposing that the same active force may be and not be completely manifested in the same act at the same moment. And yet this contradiction is implied in the third supposition. For, according to it, the substance of God would be shown forth in several acts or existences at the same time, being in one of them complete and in the others incomplete. Hence, the divine substance would have a complete act, and yet it would not be complete.

For it would not be complete in many other acts. Therefore, we conclude that beings which are separated from God in their personal life must be also separated from him in their substance, and consequently *emanatism* is false.

Several objections are made by pantheists against us. For instance, they say that, according to Christian faith, there are three distinct persons in God in the same substance; and if this be not absurd, neither is it absurd to suppose the substance of God co-possessed by an infinite number of persons.

We answer this difficulty by denying the parity. For the three persons of the Trinity are not three acts or three independent determinations of the divine substance, but only distinct terms, none of which is complete without the others, as the three are essentially necessary to the nature of God. But this is not the case with the *co-possession* of the emanatists. For the co-possessing beings would in

their system be real and separate acts of the same substance, and this hypothesis we have refuted.

It is objected, in the second place, that every being produced by another must be a mere mode of its producer, and hence the anti-pantheistic idea of creation is absurd. For if the being produced be not a mere mode of its cause, either the cause and effect have the same attributes or they have not. If they have the same attributes, they are identical; and if they have not the same attributes, how can we suppose the cause to give its effect attributes which the cause does not possess? We answer, in the first place, by observing that herein lies the mystery of creation; which being a fact well attested by reason, can not be given up because of obscurity met with in trying to understand it. The sun is still the sun though clouds may obscure its shining. Besides, in fact it is no more difficult for us to explain the production of one substance by

another than for the pantheists to explain the production of modes by a substance. And now that we have made this remark, we answer the difficulty directly by saying that it is neither true nor certain that because the producer and produced have the same attributes they are therefore identical. For to be identical they must have the same existence and essence. And as to the second hypothesis, it is true the cause must have the reality which it gives to the effect; but the cause may have this reality in a different way, or in a different degree from the effect.

It is again objected that finite beings, from the very fact that they participate in the nature of infinite being, must be identified with it. For only that being is distinct and separate from infinite being which in no ways participates in it.

This we deny. Participation is not identity; it is only similitude, which will be greater or less according to the degree of participation.

It is finally objected that unless we admit the theory of pantheism we must deny the infinity of God. For if God be infinite he must contain all being, and hence there can be no being out of him. In a word, let us suppose the being of God to be represented by the letter X , and the being of creatures by the letter Y . If we suppose Y not to be included in X , as we do; then X , the infinite, will be less than $X + Y$. In other words, X will be, at the same time infinite and not infinite. It will be infinite as it is supposed, and it will not be infinite since it will not contain the being Y .

We answer this difficulty by observing that the expression $X + Y > X$ is only true when Y adds something to the intrinsic value of X . In the present case Y adds nothing to X *intrinsically* but only *extensively*. A man, for instance, who has several copies of the same book, has not more science, by this fact, than he who has only one copy. X possesses in an

eminent degree all the perfections contained in Y ; for Y is an exemplar struck off from its type which is in X . Of course there is a natural mystery in the distinction caused by creation between X and Y . In this answer the natural mystery is supposed, but in the opinion of the pantheists there is an absurdity implied; since the being X can not be infinite, for it has finite parts, namely, Y .

QUESTION THIRTEENTH.

WHAT IS BEAUTY IN ART?

WHEN we behold certain objects either in nature or in art, as a landscape, a palace, or a statue, we experience in the first place a sensation accompanied with the idea of some excellence in the object. Secondly, we pronounce it to be pretty, handsome, beautiful, or sublime. Finally, we experience a certain pleasure in our soul which incites us to love the object contemplated. And those three phenomena give us the psychological analysis of what is called the aesthetic taste. Let us then endeavor to expose the systems of different authors regarding the nature of the beautiful; and secondly, let us give its true

notion. Many indeed are the systems of different authors regarding the nature of the beautiful. Some identify it with *utility*; some place it in *novelty* or *custom*; some in *magnitude* or *exaggeration*; others in *imitation* or *illusion*; in *proportion* of parts, or in unity joined to *variety*. Let us expose, in the first place, the system of *utility*.

A thing is said to be useful when it is advantageous to us, that is, when it satisfies our natural wants, or procures us pleasure. An object may be useful either in the present or in the future, as we enjoy it actually or only in hope. It may be immediately or mediately useful, according as it gives us immediate pleasure or is only the means by which we may procure objects capable of imparting pleasure. Thus the fruit which we eat is useful in the present; the fruit as yet unplucked from the tree is an example of the future useful. In both cases, whether we eat it or only have the ex-

pectation of consuming it or enjoying it, it is immediately useful, while the money with which we may procure it is only immediately useful.

Thus far the whole utilitarian school agree; but now they begin to diverge into many systems. The *sensualists* make beauty consist in present and immediate utility; thus identifying the beautiful with the sensible impression which objects incite in us. According to this system things are beautiful when they give us pleasant sensations; ugly, when the impressions produced are not pleasant. Hence beauty and deformity are mere sensible facts with which reason or idea has nothing to do.

Hence, it is impossible to make any theory on the beautiful, or try to determine, *à priori*, why external objects affect us pleasantly or unpleasantly. Therefore the two latter elements of æsthetic taste mentioned above are rejected; for the sensualists admit no judgment or æs-

thetic sense as distinguished from the first impression of an object, in their psychological analysis of the beautiful.

Others of the sensualist school make beauty consist in the future useful, whether mediate or immediate. They explain their theory thus: When an object is presented to our regard, it impresses a beautiful sensation upon us, and either by the force of the impression itself, or by calling in the aid of the memory, we pronounce the object to be either useful or useless and injurious.

If we judge it useful, we desire to enjoy it, and hence it is beautiful. If it be useless, we experience no æsthetic sense whatever; we are moved towards it neither by feelings of admiration nor dislike. And if we judge it to be injurious, we shrink from it, we abhor it, and call it ugly or deformed. Thus ripe crops in the fields or trees laden with fruit are beautiful, because they are useful; whilst a shipwreck, or any thing else betokening

destruction, is ugly because it is or may be injurious to us. Thus far the second school of utilitarians.

In order to refute both opinions we establish the following proposition: The beautiful or the *deformed in nature does not consist in the pleasant or unpleasant impressions made on us by sensible objects*. To prove this proposition, we remark, in the first place, that the impressions produced on us by external objects are entirely subjective and relative, depending on the peculiarity of each individual's mind, and having no existence in the objects themselves. But when we judge a thing to be beautiful, we suppose something objective and absolute in beauty; we are persuaded that beauty is in the object, and that it would exist even though the impressions should cease to exist. Consequently we can not identify beauty with our sensible impressions. Besides, unity is one of the conditions of the beautiful; thus, that a house may be

beautiful it must constitute one whole being, though having several distinct parts; but unity is altogether an intellectual conception which no sensible impression can give us. For unity essentially expresses either a relation of parts to a whole or of parts to each other. Now the notion of such relation sensibility can not give; for it is the nature of this faculty to give us as many impressions as there are parts in the external object. And again the same species of beauty is found in objects giving entirely different impressions. For instance, the solemn music of a church choir, the pomp of the ceremonies, and the religious architecture of the building excite the same species of æsthetic feelings in us, and have a relation to each other; while the music of the opera, the architecture of a theatre, and the mazes of the ballet, though giving similar impressions, and though beautiful in themselves, would be out of place in the sanctuary, because the beautiful is different in both

cases. But this difference is inexplicable in the system which we are refuting. For if beauty consists only in the sensible impression produced in us by an object, any two objects would be beautiful only in case the impressions produced were alike; but this would not hold good in the examples cited; for what similarity is there between the sounds of the music and the colors of the objects mentioned? This opinion may be refuted also by considering how the æsthetic faculty acts. For according to the system which we are discussing, whenever the impression is the same, the æsthetical judgment should be the same. But this does not happen. For in the first place, if we suppose two men, one a connoisseur and the other not, to examine a painting of some excellence, the sensible impression produced will be the same in both cases, yet evidently the æsthetical judgment will not be identical, for that of the connoisseur will show a greater ap-

preciation of beauty than that of his less skilled companion; therefore the æsthetical object can not be identified with the sensible impression.

Secondly, the æsthetical faculty may be educated by the exercise of attention and with the aid of documents. Hence, the beautiful does not consist in the impression produced by the objects; for if such were the case, the judgment of the beauty of an object could not be changed without changing the sensible impression; but we know by experience that many an object which for a long time may not have pleased us, finally gives us æsthetical delight, without any change of the impression having been produced. Finally, from the fact that men dispute daily about the beautiful or deformed, we may conclude that neither consists in the pleasant or unpleasant impressions produced in us by external objects. - For as these impressions are merely subjective, it would be folly to dispute about the fact wheth-

er they were pleasant or unpleasant, since it would depend on each individual's private appreciation, against which no arguments would avail. Nor can it be objected in favor of this opinion that the presence of beautiful objects affects us pleasantly, while the presence of deformed objects affects us unpleasantly, and that this phenomenon is therefore the effect of the sensible impression produced; for this is confounding the cause with the effect. It is the idea of the beautiful that produces the æsthetical judgment. The impression is the result and not the cause of the beautiful.

In the second place, we assert that *the notion of the beautiful consists neither in the mediate nor the immediate future utility of objects.* This assertion is the opposite of utilitarianism—a system which is partially the result of the philosophy of the materialists of the last century. In the first place, we observe that there are many objects useful which are not beautiful;

for instance, the tools of workmen and artisans. Besides, if we identify the beautiful with the useful, it will follow that the more useful the object is, the more beautiful it will be. But experience teaches this to be false. For instance, antique vases are much less useful for drinking purposes than modern goblets, yet not, on that account, less beautiful. And this same principle holds in architecture, for it is not always the most commodious or useful house that is the most beautiful. Again, a fruit-tree is more useful to the possessor than to the traveler who contemplates it, yet it is equally beautiful to both. Again, it would follow from the utilitarian system that those would be the best connoisseurs of beauty who would be the best judges of utility. But experience shows that utilitarians have generally no taste for beauty, while the admirers of beauty are usually poor judges of utility. Hence, countries like our own, in which the utilitarian spirit

prevails, seldom attain to great eminence in the cultivation of the fine arts. Moreover, according to the system we are refuting, we should first see if any thing be useful before pronouncing it to be beautiful. Now, this does not happen. For when the same object is useful and beautiful, we judge it to be beautiful without thinking expressly of its utility. In fact we can hardly consider a thing as useful without making an abstraction of its beauty. For instance, I may look at a tree and consider it beautiful without attending to its utility. But when I begin to think that its branches, its wood, may serve to make a fire and warm me, the tree loses its beauty. And, in like manner, the symmetry and order of the viands disposed on the table for a banquet may afford us a beautiful spectacle; but if, pressed by hunger, we think how useful they are to satisfy the cravings of our appetite, beauty vanishes and utility takes its place.

Hence, the useful and the beautiful are distinct, and in some way opposed, at least as objects of thought. We must observe, however, in conclusion, that although the useful does not constitute the foundation of our æsthetical judgments, it has often a part in them. For it sometimes happens that an object, beautiful in itself, fails to excite any æsthetical feeling in us on account of some injurious property it may possess or because of some danger connected with it. In this case the æsthetical feeling is kept in the background by the injury that is threatened. Thus, a man whose house is on fire does not think much of the beauty of the conflagration, nor does he contemplate the spectacle with æsthetical feelings, but rather his mind is occupied with the loss he sustains. But even in this case the spectacle of the burning mass does not cease to be beautiful if not sublime.

The next system is that which identifies beauty with novelty or with habitual

familiarity. Here we have two systems rather than one, for continued familiarity is directly opposed to novelty; but we discuss both together, as the observations to be made on both are alike.

Regarding the system of novelty, we remark that new things naturally please us, and gradually, as we become more familiar with them, the pleasure first experienced decreases, till, after long possession, it ends in disgust.

Beauty then is in novelty and deformity in long possession, say the partisans of this system. Hence, beauty and deformity are not qualities inherent in objects; they are merely extrinsic and accidental relations.

The partisans of the other system say that experience teaches that we are pleased with old and familiar things. What at first sight displeased us gradually grows pleasant to the sight, and hence custom or habit is the cause of beauty, and novelty the cause of deformity. For

instance, the deformity which the Caucasian race finds in the dark hue of the African's skin is something which would entirely disappear by practical miscegenation.

Now, we admit the truth of the facts alleged by the partisans of these systems, but at the same time we deny the inference deduced from them. We assert that neither novelty nor continued familiarity gives the true notion of beauty. We shall, however, attempt to show the various effects of novelty and familiarity, and reconcile the apparent contradictions alleged by the partisans of each system.

If beauty were identified either with novelty or with familiarity, these three assertions would be true, namely, first, every thing beautiful should be new or it should be old; second, every thing new or every thing old should be beautiful; and third, in both systems the beautiful should consist in the mere accidental and extrinsic relation of objects. But experience shows

that these three assertions are false. For, in the first place, many things are beautiful which are not new, which have not novelty. For instance, the starry sky, which we have been contemplating from our childhood. And in fact, many things are beautiful to us, because we have been long familiar with them, and on the other hand, many things are beautiful which are not familiar. We see beauty in them at the first glance. In the second place, all new or familiar things are not beautiful; for some new things are indifferent, others appear beautiful, and others ugly, simply because they are new; while many objects do not appear more beautiful to us after long familiarity with them than they did when we first became acquainted with them.

Thirdly, we apprehend beauty in the object as something absolute, and not depending on our mind. Thus, a landscape in May would be beautiful, though we were not living to behold it. Conse-

quently beauty does not consist in a mere accidental or extrinsic relation of objects to each other or to us, and hence neither novelty, nor habit, nor custom, nor long-continued familiarity constitutes the beautiful.

Yet there are certain æsthetical effects produced in the mind by novelty and familiarity. Novelty produces two effects in the mind. Firstly, it puts the mind in a new state of existence. Secondly, it excites the mind more vividly in that state. Hence, there are as many kinds of novelty as there are states of the mind. Thus, there is novelty for the intellect, when it begins to know what has hitherto been unknown to it, or when it knows an object in many ways after having known it only in one. And there is novelty for the sensibility when we have a feeling not experienced before. Hence, there may be novelty in our perception of objects, whether beautiful, ugly, or deformed. If we ask the reason why the

mind is excited so vividly by novelty, the answer is, that the vivacity of our affections depends upon the degree of attention we give the object. If there be inattention, there will be neither joy nor sorrow. Hence, when we wish to divert the mind of a friend from grief, we advise him not to think of it; that is to say, not to give it his attention. A new object, therefore, excites attention, and hence excites the mind; but, when we become accustomed to the object, our attention gradually flags and our mind grows cool. Hence, familiarity or custom produces an effect directly contrary to that of novelty. Should we ask now the cause of these effects, we shall find it first, in the nature of the object; and second, in the peculiar disposition of the subject. The object may be either pleasant, unpleasant, or indifferent. If the object be agreeable, then the pleasure caused by it will be greater by novelty and weaker by familiarity. In this case undoubtedly novelty is the cause of

beauty. But if the object be disagreeable in itself, the unpleasant impression produced by its novelty will gradually melt away with custom or familiarity. And if the object be neither agreeable nor disagreeable, neither novelty nor familiarity will enhance its æsthetic impression. As to the other cause of the effect of novelty or familiarity, namely, the disposition of the subject, we remark that there are two dispositions, apparently opposed, which have great influence on the æsthetic taste as to objects new or old. One of these dispositions is the love of perfectibility; the other the love of repose. We all desire to be perfect, and hence we desire that which may either increase our knowledge or our happiness, while, at the same time, we love our ease, and are naturally averse to labor. But, as in the present state of existence, there is no perfection possible without toil and trouble, our love of ease and desire of perfectibility can not be satisfied at the

same time in this life, and, consequently, one must preponderate over the other, according to the different temperaments of individuals. Hence, one class of men love novelty, another dislike or fear it, and are pleased only with what is old. In the one the love of perfectibility predominates, hence they love new things and detest routine. Young people are generally of this character, for their love of knowledge and their activity are great; while old persons, being swayed by the love of repose, distrust what is new, for they fear lest it should trouble their long-cherished theories and thus disturb their equanimity. The young man is *cupidus novi*, the old one, *laudator temporis acti*. These seem to be the causes of the different effects produced by novelty and familiarity.

Let us now endeavor to reconcile the opposite facts alleged by the partisans of both these systems. It is not difficult to conceive how a new object may be more beautiful than an old one, and *vice versa*.

In the first place, let us suppose an object beautiful in itself to attract our attention. We are moved by its beauty, for in knowing it we are perfecting our faculties, and our attention is more excited. Indeed, in the first instance, we may admire it more than it deserves, because we expect in it hidden beauties which it has not. But in a longer and more careful examination, not discovering those beauties, and the hopes that were raised being disappointed, we become displeased, our attention and admiration grow less, and the object partially or completely loses its beauty.

In this case novelty begets beauty and familiarity creates deformity. But let us suppose, on the other hand, that something new makes an unpleasant impression on us, or disturbs our tranquillity of mind, or attacks our deep-rooted prejudices. Here, though the object should be really beautiful, it will not appear so to us at first, because of the unpleasant sen-

sation it produces being so great as to prevent our attention from resting on the real beauties of the being. But when, by familiarity, the first unpleasant impression becomes weaker, the beauties of the object, at first hidden, gradually manifest themselves to our mind, and that which at first we considered deformed we begin to think beautiful.

QUESTION FOURTEENTH.

DOES BEAUTY CONSIST IN MAGNITUDE OR EXAGGERATION? IN ILLUSION OR IMITATION?

HE next system to be discussed is that of magnitude or exaggeration. There is a certain school in art and literature, called the romantic, which contends that nothing is beautiful which is not exaggerated beyond the ordinary proportions of nature. Hence, even in the moral order, great crimes and monsters are models of the beautiful, notwithstanding the assertion of the classic school to the contrary, which makes virtue only beautiful and vice hideous. The romantic school hold that great vice constitutes the beautiful, because there is something superhuman

in it; and unfortunately, they endeavor to realize their theory in both the arts and literature. We shall not speak of the injurious effect of this system upon good morals, as we are not writing on a question of ethics but of æsthetics. We therefore formulate the following proposition: *Beauty does not consist in mere magnitude.* If it were true that beauty consisted in magnitude, then it would follow that the greater an object is, the more beautiful it would be. But experience shows this to be absurd. For in the moral order, to which the romantics love to appeal, are not the little virtues more beautiful than the great crimes against nature? In the second place, the romantics destroy the distinction between the beautiful and the deformed. That such a distinction exists no one can deny, for the deformed is the negation of the beautiful, and no two things can be more different than the positive and the negative. Now, if whatever is great

must be beautiful, an object of few charms or of small deformity could be made beautiful by increasing its deformity to a great degree. And consequently the beautiful would be identified with the greatest deformity, which is a contradiction in terms. Again in this system every thing great should be beautiful, whether good or bad. Now this is absurd; for let us suppose a case; robbery, for instance, whether great or small, can never make a beautiful action. For you can not change the deformity of its essence, which consists in the unjust taking away of an object. Indeed, the deformity will be increased in proportion to the greatness of the crime. Nor can any circumstance change its nature; for instance, greatness of mind or the audacity of the robber. For although these qualities are beautiful in themselves, they can never change the nature of the act, which is at the same time bad and ugly.

Moreover, it is absurd to suppose that

the greatest crimes and the most heroic actions are equally beautiful. Individual consciousness and the common-sense of mankind reject this theory. We can never force ourselves to regard the crimes of Caligula or Nero as equally beautiful with the virtues of Charlemagne, St. Henry, or St. Louis. But even *à priori* this system is shown to be false, by considering the very nature of exaggeration and beauty. Beauty is a quality inherent in the very nature of the object. Magnitude only increases or intensifies the object without changing its essence. Consequently an object beautiful in itself may have its beauty increased or diminished according to its size. But the size can not change the nature of the object, or make it beautiful if it be deformed or deformed if it be beautiful. But it may be objected that there are in reality objects deformed in themselves which become beautiful by exaggeration; namely, the vice of pride, when person-

ified in Milton's Satan, becomes sublime and beautiful. But we answer that here it is the representation, and not the thing itself which is beautiful. For according to Boileau,

"Il n'est point de serpents ni de monstre odieux,
Qui par l'art imité ne puisse plaire aux yeux."

Besides, in most of the cases that might be alleged by the romantics, we would find that it was the great power or intelligence displayed, rather than the action itself, which constituted the beautiful in them.

From the fact that the representation of vice or virtue may be beautiful, some authors have concluded that beauty consists entirely in imitation. Hence, for them an object is beautiful, if it be a perfect representation; if not, it is ugly. Regarding this point we may make three inquiries: Firstly, Whether there be any beauty at all in imitation? Secondly, Whether all beauty be in it? Thirdly, In what the beauty of imitation consists?

There is some beauty in imitation. This experience proves. For many natural objects, indifferent to our taste in themselves, become really beautiful as images. Indeed the real attraction of the Flemish school of painting comes from this. Moreover, even things which are deformed in themselves please us when represented by art, or at least do not excite the same horror as when in their natural state. Even objects which are beautiful in themselves acquire an increase of accidental beauty, merely on account of their representation. Consequently it follows that there is some beauty in imitation.

Yet beauty, generally speaking, must be distinguished from imitation. For otherwise all beauty would consist in imitation, and then these four consequences would follow: Firstly, only works of art would be beautiful. Secondly, among the works of art only those would be beautiful which would be imitations. Thirdly,

that would be the more beautiful which would be the better imitation. Fourthly, in these same works there would be no other beauty than that which would arise from *imitation*.

Now these four consequences are absurd. In the first place, besides works of art, other objects are beautiful, namely, the human body, the sky, or a meadow in summer. Secondly, many works of art which are not imitations are beautiful. For instance, a palace, a piece of music, a painting, or a statue, may be imitations of nature, but realizations of the ideal, and yet be beautiful. In fact, in some works of art imitation may be merely accidental in them. Thirdly, of two works of art, that one is often judged to be the more beautiful in which there is the less imitation. Take, for instance, two statues the one representing a real man, and the other an ideal archetype; the latter is often the more beautiful. Again, in the imitative works of art, there are generally

two kinds of beauty or of deformity: one consisting in the perfection or the imperfection of the imitation, the other being entirely distinct from it. For instance, the picture of a monster will be beautiful inasmuch as it imitates; and deformed inasmuch as it relates to an ugly object. If a painter, who wishes to take the portrait of a man, makes an image unlike his archetype, the picture may not be on this account ugly, but very beautiful, compared to the subject. Consequently there is another kind of beauty besides that of imitation.

Should we ask now what it is that pleases us in imitation, there are two different opinions on this subject. Some say it is the similarity itself, or the illusion the image produces in our mind. While others deny this and say it is the judgment which pronounces the imitation to be the work of some intelligent being; that is to say, we do not admire the imitation, properly speaking, but the intel-

lectual labor which it supposes. It is the skill of the artist which pleases us.

Of these two opinions we reject the former and adopt the latter, for the following reasons: Similarity can not be the sense of the pleasure which we feel in contemplating the copies of natural things; for if it were so, we should experience the same æsthetic savor in beholding similar objects in nature. We should feel the same pleasure in seeing, for instance, two trees that are alike, as in viewing the images of the trees.

Moreover, the latter opinion is based on experience. Suppose an instance. If we see two pictures that look alike, they may not strike us as beautiful so long as we imagine them to be the work of the same artist. But when we are told that one is the copy of the other, our admiration is instantly excited. We admire the ability of the copyist. We admire the effort of one mind to copy the work of another. Hence, the greater the skill dis-

played in the execution of the work, the more beauty shall we perceive in it, on account of the greater difficulties to be overcome. Thus far then we have explained the nature of the æsthetic element in works of imitation. Let us now examine the next system, namely, that which identifies beauty with proportion and order of parts.

QUESTION FIFTEENTH.

DOES BEAUTY CONSIST IN PROPORTION AND ORDER OF PARTS OR IN UNITY AND VARIETY?

HE system which identifies beauty with proportion and order of parts is one of the oldest and most respected theories on the subject. One of its ablest defenders in modern times is the Perè André in his "Essai sur le Beau." The partisans of this system understand by order the disposition of parts in a being to each other. Thus, order in the human body consists in the fact that the different members have a determined place as parts of the whole. And this order is the first element of human beauty. Thus the nose is in the

centre of the face; the eyes are either side of it, and the mouth below it, all in order. But beauty is not complete without proportion, its second element.

Proportion consists in the difference of degrees in duration, intensity, or extension. Thus in music or dancing there is the proportion of duration. For the sounds or motions must succeed each other in uniform times. We also find in music an example of the proportion of intensity. The notes must not be discordant, and consequently the number of vibrations must be greater or less to effect the purpose. Finally, in bodies we have the proportion of extension, as in the human countenance the length or shortness of the features will have relative effects on a man's good looks.

But there are various ways of understanding this system of proportion and order of parts. It can not mean that every order and proportion will make beauty, for then all objects would be

beautiful, since in all there are a certain order and proportion. It means, therefore, that among all possible orders and proportions there is one that necessarily makes an object beautiful. But why should this order and proportion make the beautiful and not the others? This is a question to which four different answers are given, and which give rise to four different opinions. The first holds that the cause of this beauty in *order* and proportion is found in the very essence of things. That among all possible orders there is one which by its very nature is absolute order and proportion, and therefore constitutes the beautiful. The *second* opinion gives a subjective origin to the beautiful in proportion. It maintains that the beautiful of proportion is produced in us by a habit or by a peculiar disposition of our nature. For instance, the hunchback appears ugly to us because we are accustomed to see all other men straight. The third opinion places the

beauty of order and proportion in the apt disposition of the parts of the object to its end. While the *fourth opinion* maintains that objects, which in themselves are neither beautiful nor deformed are so inasmuch as they are signs of invisible beauty. We shall speak of this last system later. Let us now discuss the three first opinions.

We affirm, in the first place, that *no order or proportion of parts considered in itself, or essentially, can constitute the beautiful*. It is impossible to find in the essence of things one order surpassing another; for all combinations of order or proportion are equally indifferent if considered independently of any extrinsic relation. Besides, according to the hypothesis which we refute, we should be delighted with the beauty of an object in proportion to the degree of knowledge we might have of its parts. Hence, to use a familiar example, we should be less pleased when we merely behold a fine-looking

man than when we have a knowledge of the proportion of all his parts, as, for instance, that the circumference of the neck is equal to the circumference of the calf of his leg. But experience teaches that the geometrical measurement instead of increasing our æsthetic taste, disgusts us. In the third place, if order essentially makes beauty, this order must be the same for all species of beings, or it must be different for different kinds of beings; that is, one species of beauty would constitute that of a horse, another that of a tree, etc. But neither of these two opinions can be held. If the first supposition be true, then we should find the same proportion and order in all beautiful objects, or at least an approximation to a common type. But this contradicts experience, for where is the similarity of proportion between a pretty woman, a fine palace, and a beautiful rose? Nor is the second hypothesis true; for, if it were, then there could be no degrees in beauty.

—no comparison, because in each being there would be a proportion of parts that would make it perfectly beautiful in its kind.

Thus, the proportion of parts in the round, plump, and juicy body of a fat partridge would be equally beautiful with the most perfect specimen of the Ionian style of architecture. From what has been thus far seen, it must follow that beauty does not consist in any order or proportion, which by familiarity or a disposition of our nature would seem beautiful in itself, since we have shown the effects of familiarity in refuting another system.

Nor is the beautiful constituted by order and proportion considered in the aptness of the parts of a being for attaining the end of its creation. For if this system were true, we should have to acknowledge the same beauty in all created beings; for there are none of them whose parts are not aptly disposed by the Crea-

tor to the end for which they were destined. But this consequence we know to be false. Moreover, experience shows the contrary of this system to be true; for the form and parts of a hog, for instance, might be changed so as to make it more beautiful, yet they would not be so well adapted to the attaining of its end. Again, if beauty consisted in the aptitude of the parts of an object to its end, then the following absurd consequences would follow: Firstly, in every judgment regarding the beauty of an object, the consideration of its end should be first in the order of thought. Secondly, we could never pronounce an object beautiful without knowing the design for which it was created. But who does not see the absurdity of these two consequences; for who has ever said that a mouth was beautiful because it was fitted for eating or speaking? And again, every day we pronounce objects to be most beautiful without knowing the end for which they were created. Yet although

we have said so much against the system of order and proportion, it must be admitted that they partake of beauty inasmuch as they show forth the intelligence of some agent accommodating beings to an end.

SYSTEM OF UNITY IN VARIETY.

Some very able philosophers hold that beauty consists in variety reduced to unity. St. Augustine says, in his 18th Epistle, "*Omnis porro pulchritudinis forma est unitas.*" But to this unity moderns have added variety. There may be unity in variety in many ways. Thus the various phenomena which take place in the same space or time, are said to have unity of time or space. Again, there may be several modes in a substance, as in the soul there are various thoughts and sentiments. This unity in variety may exist when several beings have the same end, or are adapted to produce the same effect. The partisans of this system do

not agree in placing this unity in variety in any *one* of these forms. They generally explain it, however, according to the last example, and, indeed, it is the most beautiful kind of unity. According to this system, therefore, a musical composition is beautiful when the various notes and sounds have the same general idea or impression; and the beauty of a poem or tragedy consists in the various actions, characters, or parts tending to a common end or catastrophe. Before discussing the claims of this system, let us make two observations. In the first place, we remark that the system of unity explained according to the third manner, does not differ much from the system of order and proportion taken to express the adaptation of parts to the attaining of a common end; for order can not exist without the accommodation of means to an end.

Hence, the partisans of the system of order and proportion, as Perè André for instance, admit unity as its complement.

There is, however, a difference between the two systems; for in the adaptation of means to an end, two things may be distinguished: First, the intrinsic fitness of each part to an end; and secondly, the harmony of all the parts in producing that end. In the first consists the idea of proportion; in the second that of unity. We observe, in the second place, that the system of unity is the same as the system of symmetry, for symmetry is only an effect of unity. Having premised these few remarks, let us now discuss the value of this system, inasmuch as it pretends to give the true explanation of the sublime and beautiful.

We deny that the beautiful is found in unity considered in itself. If the contrary of this proposition were true, it would follow that in all objects which have the same unity, we should find the same degree of beauty. But experience shows the contrary to be the case; for in the various works of nature, we find beauties

the most diverse in degree and kind, yet we find unity equally in all. Thus, the beauty in the horse and in the ass is different; yet there is the same unity in their constitution. The same may be said of works of art, for we can conceive two poems perfectly equal in unity, but not so in beauty. On the other hand, the tragedies of Shakespeare have less unity in their plan, yet are far more beautiful than the more regularly compiled works of less capable dramatic authors. But although unity in itself does not constitute beauty, nevertheless it adds to the beauty of an object, inasmuch as unity is a sign of intellectual labor; and experience teaches that there are no beautiful objects which have not more or less of unity. Unity is therefore a condition, but not the constituent of beauty, and it is in this sense we are to understand the text of St. Augustine.

QUESTION SIXTEENTH.

IS THE BEAUTIFUL THE "SPLENDOR VERI"
AS PLATO DEFINES IT?

HE beautiful may be considered in two ways, firstly in external and visible forms, as in a palace or statue; secondly, as purely intelligible, devoid of all sensible representation, contemplated by the intellect. We mean by the beauty of sensible forms that which is represented by the senses. Now, if we should ask in what this species of beauty consists, we should receive two answers. The first says that beauty is in the form itself as one of its characteristics; while the second maintains that beauty is not in the form, that the form is a mere sign by which our mind's eye

is enlightened to contemplate the true beautiful, which is in the intelligible. The systems so far explained adopt the first manner of explaining the notion of the beautiful; but, since we have refuted them, we can not admit their theory; for we understand by the sensible form the sensation which it excites, or the total representation of the object, which representation consists in the impression of our sensibility, and the conception of our intellect. But the sensible form considered in itself can not be called the beautiful regarded in any of the two ways of explaining it. It can not be called such in the first manner, for we have proved that beauty differs essentially from the impression. To call it so in the second manner is equally impossible; for the intellectual conceptions which added to the impression can all be reduced to the ideas of order and unity. But we have already shown that neither order nor unity in itself makes the beautiful,

although they are both conditions of beauty. External forms are, therefore, the signs of invisible beauty according to the second hypothesis which we admit. They are symbols or types of invisible beauty. Let us now develop and explain this system, by examining the following questions: Firstly, What is a symbol? Secondly, Are all sensible forms symbols? Thirdly, Is their symbolism the foundation of all their aesthetic properties? Fourthly, How may the beauty or deformity of objects be determined by their symbolism? Let us answer the first question on the nature and division of symbols. A symbol is a sensible phenomenon exciting in us the idea of a reality. For instance, the figure with the balance in her hand is a symbol of justice and equity. There are many kinds of symbols, divided according to the principle of their origin, their clearness, or their determination. The principle of symbolism is the association of ideas and

sensations; and hence there may be as many kinds of symbols as there are modes of associating ideas and sensations.

Thus there are natural symbols, arbitrary symbols, and symbols of custom, as there may be a natural, arbitrary, or customary association of ideas. As to their clearness, symbols are divided into clear and obscure, according as their meaning is discovered with ease or difficulty. But this clearness is not absolute but relative; for a symbol which may be obscure to one may be very clear to another. Thus symbols derived from the manners or religion of a people, are very intelligible to them, though quite obscure to others. A more particular application of this principle may be found in the symbolism of the Catholic Church, well understood within its pale, though not outside of it. As to the degree of determination of symbols, they are either vague or specific.

Vague symbols express something in a general way; for instance, a passion or

state of the mind, as joy or sadness, without particularizing any thing. Specific symbols express the thing with circumstances. Some symbols are vague by their very nature, as in music; others are essentially specific, as in painting; while others again, as words in language, are either vague or specific at will. It is not difficult to prove that all sensible things are symbols of invisible things; for the sensible phenomena of nature may be reduced to sounds, colors, lines, and motions. All sounds have reference to the ear, while the three last in the category are seen by the eye. But all these express something invisible, for they all have the power of expressing the invisible. We might even prove the symbolism of sensible things by an *à priori* argument, for all of them show forth a degree of being. They manifest modifications of an active force, but the active force is invisible. Hence sensible forms are symbols of the invisible. But it will now

be asked, In what does this invisible consist? We answer that the invisible, expressed by sensible forms in creation, is of two kinds; the first consists in some quality, property, or attribute of the Author of being, as when, for instance, the Scripture says, "The skies tell the glory of God;" or as when a well-executed picture shows the skill of the artist. It requires reflection, however, on our part to perceive this invisible. The *other* part of the invisible symbolized by sensible forms, consists in moral qualities; as, when, either by nature or from consent, certain sensible signs are used to express invisible beings. They express, in the first place, undetermined being, or being in general; and in the second place, they express such and such a degree of being, which it is sometimes very difficult to apprehend.

Yet we always find that the foundation of the æsthetic properties in sensible beings is their symbolism. If we examine

closely the relation between the force of expression in beings, and their power of exciting æsthetic feelings, we shall find them to be identical. In the first place, objects please us in proportion to their power of expression; and, as we descend in the scale of creation, we find the beauty of beings grow less as we descend in species. Animals are more beautiful than plants, and plants more beautiful than minerals. Moreover, if we consider the same thing in two different states of a being, in that one in which it will have the greater expression it will certainly be more beautiful. Thus as there is a great difference between the power of expression in the face of a living and of a dead man, so there is a difference in their beauty. Again, some objects please us only after a time, when we become familiar with them. Pleasure in beholding them commences only when we begin to understand their meaning. Experience also teaches that those men who appreciate the symbolism

of beings the best are the most capable of perceiving their beauty. Thus many natural objects, whose beauty poets and artists feel vividly, move not in the least the rustic mind. The rustic looks only at the utility of the object, and cares not for its expression, while the poet and the artist admire its expression. Hence, there is truth in saying that it is the poet and the artist that give sense and beauty to inanimate things. Even if we observe the impression which inanimate things produce in us, we shall find that it is not the form or external shape that pleases us in nature or in art, but that which it expresses. In a church, for instance, it is the religious expression of the arches and columns; or the nobility, the majesty, benevolence, and generosity, expressed by the statues or paintings representing human forms that excite in us emotions of beauty. In fact, the words we use on beholding such objects refer less to them than to their expression.

But let us now inquire how the deformity or beauty of objects is determined by their symbolism. Upon this question there are two opinions. The first maintains that beauty and deformity are joined in beings in proportion to their power of expression; that is to say, an object is beautiful that can give expression, and deformed when there is no expression in it. The partisans of the *second* system hold that beauty or deformity consists in the thing expressed, and not in the thing expressing. Objects are beautiful or deformed because they express this or that idea. Of these two opinions we must admit the latter, for the former would lead us into absurdities. It would, in the first place, make us maintain that every object which expresses something is beautiful; and again, that two objects having equal expression have equal beauty. It is not difficult to show the absurdity of these consequences. In the first place, experience teaches that beings which ex-

press nothing are not therefore deformed, since there are many things in the world indifferent with respect to beauty. But this could not be the case in the opinion we refute; for according to it beings should have expression and therefore be beautiful, or they should be deprived of expression and therefore ugly, so that there could be no such thing as æsthetical indifference. Nor can it be objected that there are objects in which a defect of expression implies a defect of beauty; as, for instance, a poem or a statue may have no value as a work of art. It is not on this account deformed in the true sense of the word; and even if it were deformed, this would prove nothing against us; for its deformity would not arise from a want of expression, but of the *true expression*; it would arise from the defective skill or genius of the maker. Again, it is false that beauty is found in every object that expresses something. The face of a monkey is very expressive, but certainly not

beautiful, and so is the face of a drunkard or a man excited by anger; yet none of these has beauty. It is equally false that two objects having equal expression have equal beauty. We can show this by taking two works of art, two statues, for instance, one representing the passion of anger, the other the virtue of purity. Each has great expression, they may both have equal expression; but certainly their beauty will not be equal. Take, for example, the statue of Silenus and that of Abraham; the one representing drunkenness, the other the great patriarch about to offer up his only son to God. They may have equal expression, but certainly not equal beauty. Beauty, therefore, consists in the invisible type expressed by the sensible form. Let us now examine the qualities and characteristics of invisible beauty. What is this invisible beauty? And what are the conditions required that it should affect us æsthetically? According to Plato, beauty

is the *splendor veri*. That which is true is beautiful, and objects will be more or less beautiful in proportion to their degree of participation in the reality of God who is truth itself. We must admit this theory of Plato for many reasons. For a supreme rule of beauty must be admitted, and this supreme rule must be God. In our judgment upon beings, when we say that some are more beautiful than others, we acknowledge a supreme rule of beauty. For when we compare objects as greater and less, we suppose an absolute rule; for that which is relative implies the absolute, and greater and less are relative terms. There is then an absolute rule of beauty, which is absolute beauty itself. What then are the properties of this absolute rule of beauty? We answer, it must be eternal, necessary, and infinite. It must be independent of time, place, and circumstances.

For example, the act of a man undergoing martyrdom for conscience sake is

beautiful in itself, independently of all circumstances ; it is eternally beautiful ; and as this rule is eternal, it must be necessary and unchangeable. This absolute rule of beauty is also infinite ; for if it were merely finite, a higher type of beauty than it could be conceived, and therefore it would not be the supreme rule of beauty. Besides, as this rule is beauty itself, without limit or restriction, it is infinite. This invisible beauty, therefore, being absolute, eternal, and infinite, is God. Beauty is, therefore, identified with truth, and the truth of existing beings is conceived in two ways : Firstly, inasmuch as they are imitations of ideas which exist in God ; and secondly, as possessing liberty of will, and acting in conformity with the will of God. The first manner gives us real truth ; the second, voluntary truth or moral goodness. Henoe there are two kinds of beauty, *essential* and *moral*. Now beauty in beings can be considered either *absolutely* or *rel-*

atively; absolutely, when their activity or the evolution of their existence is compared with the infinite activity of God; relatively, when they are compared with individuals of the same species. Thus, when we say that man is superior to the beast, we compare beings according to infinite activity; and when we say that one man is more beautiful than another, there is question of relative beauty.

Now, deformity is the want of beauty which should exist; but the want of essential beauty, or beauty of essence, is not deformity; for if it were, all finite beings would be in a certain measure deformed, since they are all below the infinite standard of real beauty or God.

Deformity exists then only where there is a want of *moral* beauty, and consequently of voluntary truth; or when relative essential beauty is wanting as, for instance, where one man is deformed, he lacks the beauty which belongs to his species, beauty which should exist but is

wanting, and which, therefore, begets deformity. Hence sensible forms are beautiful only when they express moral or essential invisible beauty. The figure, then, which represents the human countenance will be beautiful in proportion to the majesty, benevolence, generosity, and other amiable dispositions portrayed ; and deformed in proportion as it expresses a want of virtue. But it may be objected against our theory, that an ugly face often carries a fine mind, and therefore it is not true that sensible forms are beautiful only when they express invisible beauty. To this we answer that the form may often express a different thing from that to which it is joined. The spirit of a demon may dwell in the body of a dog ; hence this objection does not contradict our theory. At any rate, the objection only gives us an exceptional case in nature ; for, as a rule, the face is an index to the mind and character, just as the sound in the musical composition of

a great artist is ever an echo of the sense.

All created beauty, then, as well as all created truth and goodness, is derived from God. God is the fulcrum on which both the psychological and ontological scales of philosophy depend. He is the *alpha* and *omega* of philosophy as of theology; He is the beginning and the end.

QUESTION SEVENTEENTH.

ARE THERE BUT TWO REAL CAUSES IN THE WORLD—MAN AND GOD?

 HERE is a system in philosophy that has some affinities with that of Berkeley and Kant, but which is nevertheless substantially distinct from them. It is called the system of occasional causes. Its partisans are Malebranche and Leibnitz; but Leibnitz gives it another name and new modifications. He calls it the system of preëstablished harmony. The fundamental tenets of this system are: 1st, that only God can act outside of ourselves; 2d, that all other beings are incapable of exercising any influence on each other; 3d, that it is God who produces all the modifications in all created substances; so that neither

man's thoughts, nor his volitions, nor his sensations, nor any other of his acts is caused by any external finite being, but only by the immediate and direct action of God on his soul. He is, as it were, a harp placed in the hands of God, and only God's fingers can touch this harp and awake its latent harmony. These principles, if true, lead to extraordinary consequences; for it will not be then mere poetry to say that the voice of God is heard in the rustling of the wind or the roaring of the thunder; that his omnipotence appears in the upheavings of the ocean; that his majesty is emblazoned in the cloud-capped mountains, and his beauty manifested in the flowery prairies; but all will be philosophic truth. According to this system, created things are only causes of their own internal acts; and especially with regard to their influence on each other, they are mere occasions; hence, it is not the fire that produces the sensation of heat, it is God, and

the fire is but an occasion, and so on. In an especial manner can this system be applied to the reciprocal action of soul and body. The body does not act on the soul, it is God; since the soul and the body are causes only of their internal acts, and with regard to the external act they are but occasions. Leibnitz supposes that the soul and the body were created in such a manner that the actions of the one would necessarily awake harmonious echoes in the other, as if two clocks were connected by a chain, and then, after having been wound up, were set in motion by the maker, so that every stroke in the one would cause a harmonious stroke in the other, and all this in virtue of a pre-established harmony between them. This modification which Leibnitz gave the system of occasional causes can not be admitted, for it destroys free-will; though there is nothing in the system, as it is given by Malebranche, that would absolutely prevent its admission. The differ-

ence between this system and that of Berkeley and Kant is easily seen. Berkeley and Kant deny the existence of bodies. Malebranche, on the contrary, admits the existence of bodies, but denies their immediate influence. He argues that God creates us in act at every instant of our lives. The modifications produced in our souls are caused by God. Creatures can not cause these; for if they did, creatures could create. A modification in the soul is a creation of something new, not existing before, and no creature can have the power of producing such an effect.

From the questions thus far treated we are led to conclude that there are but two beings in the universe that can produce their own acts—God and man. Man's acts are those of his will rather than those of his intellect. He should be defined to be, therefore, not so much a rational animal as *an animal possessing free-will.*

Intellect does not specifically distin-

guish man from the rest of creation. All creatures have a certain amount of intellectual life. The elements of matter are spiritual. Properly speaking, there is no such thing in the world as matter understood in the vulgar sense of the word. The elements of matter are simple. Their coëxistence it is which makes extension. They all participate in the divinity, and hence have something of the being of God. Now in God all is spiritual. All creatures are therefore spiritual, and participate in different degrees of intelligence. Intelligence, therefore, is not the specific attribute of man. Nor is sensibility. He has less of it in many cases than brutes. The mother's love for her child is not essentially different from that of the brute for its young. In both it is instinct; sensibility, therefore, does not specifically distinguish man from the rest of creation; but will does. It is the will that makes the man. Man has free-will, and in this he is most like

God. It is this will that constitutes him lord of creation. It is his power of choosing his own acts that makes him above all created earthly beings, makes him a mystery in creation. He is not the mere occasion of his volitions, but their real cause. How he is so is a mystery which no human intellect can solve. The mystery of free-will, the mystery of creation, and the mystery of ideal intuition are three in one. They are the trinity in unity of philosophy; the three great mysteries of the natural order, all centring in the grand mystery of creation, or distinction between God and the universe.

We shall now conclude our work by an investigation into the spirit of the age. Our views, set forth in this investigation, when compared with those preceding it, may show that the study of metaphysics, so far from injuring Christian faith, serves only to make it stronger.

QUESTION EIGHTEENTH.

WHY IS THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE ANTI-CHRISTIAN AND ANTI-PHILOSOPHIC?

 **V**ERY man given to reflection must notice something in the spirit of the age not in accord with the spirit of true philosophy. There is a tendency in our century to act contrary to the spirit of religion; and this tendency manifests itself in education as well as in action; in the school, in the senate-chamber, in law and politics. This anti-christian, which is the anti-philosophic spirit, is the offspring of what may be called a tendency to paganism. We are reviving paganism in every thing. There is a great difference, however, between ancient and modern paganism; and yet in idea and tendencies they are the same.

Our modern pagans do not, it is true, adore statues of Jupiter, Venus, and Bacchus; but they render worship to the ideas of those false deities. There are no sacrifices of human bodies, but there are of human minds: Two of the old augurs could not meet without smiling at each other's knavery; yet our modern priests of paganism, with the greatest gravity, inculcate their doctrines and believe in their truth. There is a revival of defunct paganism manifested in false history and philosophy, and in attempts to do away with the necessity of revelation and redemption. Men preach the doctrine of human perfectibility; that nature alone suffices to itself, and that Christianity should not interfere with its action. The intellect is all-powerful. In Germany it has created God in the school of Fichte and Schelling. We have doctors who preach the sufficiency of natural religion, like Jules Simon; and others who make out Christ a myth or an impostor, like Ernest Renan;

and others who teach the necessity of civil Christianity, like the so-called liberators of Italy. In short, modern paganism is like the ancient in all but idolatry. We should have, however, even this beauty of paganism among us were it not for the fact that men living under the influence of Christianity can never throw away completely all their Christian education. It has often been noticed that the existence and unity of the Church is the indirect cause of the non-dissolution of sectarian Christianity. All sects unite in their opposition to the Church; and if this cause of vitality were removed, they would shortly decompose in virtue of the principle of dissolution which is at the bottom of them all. For this same reason there can be no thorough infidel in a Christian community. Christian Catholic ideas are afloat around him, and he can not drown them. They enter his mind even against his will. He breathes in Christian air, and it helps to give him life. Hence,

modern paganism is a monstrous medley of Christian ideas with pagan inclinations and intentions. The radical principle of paganism is pride, which preaches the self-sufficiency of human nature, and leads, consequently, to the entire separation of man from his Creator. When this separation took place, two conclusions naturally followed; man lost self-knowledge; and no longer understood the end for which the inferior beings of creation were produced.

Nothing in nature is explicable without the idea of the Creator; this idea is the keystone of all knowledge. It explains every thing. But when man lost it, every thing became a mystery to him. He thought by separating himself from God he would become free, as Adam thought he would acquire more knowledge by eating the forbidden fruit and become as a god; but instead of freedom he found slavery; instead of true knowledge he lost much of what he had hitherto pos-

sessed. He was created above nature, but by separation from God he became nature's serf, the bondsman of creatures, the slave of his senses and passions. Slavery was introduced into the family and into the state, and man forgot his dignity. He introduced vice in the seat of virtue, and made idols of his base passions. This was the consequence of man's separation from God, the fruit of his self-sufficiency.

St. Thomas in his "Summa Theologica," asks himself the question, Why the Redeemer did not come into the world sooner? Why did he not choose to be born immediately after the fall, instead of waiting till forty centuries after that event? And the great doctor gives this answer; he says God wished to let man try his natural strength, to see what he could effect. God wished to let man learn a lesson in humility from the proof of the incapacity of his nature for any thing great or virtuous derived

from so long an experience. Yet even four thousand years did not suffice to teach that great lesson; for even in the nineteenth century after the coming of Christ men seem to be still ignorant of the weakness of their natural forces. This self-sufficiency is directly opposed to the economy of redemption; it is the refusal of the helper, Christ, and of his Church. In ancient paganism, therefore, we find what human nature does when left to itself; and yet not altogether to itself. For the ancient pagans had many revealed traditions which were carried away by the different peoples at the confusion of tongues in the building of Babel. Paganism was the continuation of Adam's sin; it was egotism, naturalism; the substitution of human nature in the place of God. St. Jerome tells us that paganism was symbolized in the parable of the prodigal son. Whether this be true of ancient paganism or not, it certainly applies very aptly to modern

paganism. Our modern pagans leave the house of their parent, the Church of Christ, and they go into a far off country, and they are obliged to feed on husks. They separate themselves as much as possible from God, by sundering religion from civil government; the temporal from the eternal; literature and the arts from religious influence. They make us a history without admitting a divine providence. They make us natural politics, natural morality, natural economy, and they exclude the supernatural from their philosophy. In a word, they separate faith from reason, earth from heaven; and the consequence is, that they feed on husks. They speak, write, and act like pagans. They praise the material proficiency of a country, and call it flourishing, though it be an enemy of truth and of Christianity. In their ideas a man may be a gentleman without religion. The principle of sectarian Christianity is identical with that of paganism, for sectarian-

ism is autology or self-worship. Religious self-sufficiency is, therefore, a helper of pagan naturalism. Hence in many countries the old traditions of Christian faith have been rejected by the governments; hospitals, churches, and universities have been secularized, and religion thrown in the background as if it were merely of secondary importance. The strangest feature in modern paganism is that men of intellect and rank are among its greatest supporters; yet it does not require much logic to discover its absurdity. God had but one end in view in creating this world of ours; and man, the lord of creation, has but one end also. Yet there are two orders, the natural and supernatural; but not separate though they are distinct. They are distinct in nature, and in the beings that constitute each; but they have the same ultimate end, though their proximate ends are often different. The ultimate end of all things is God; the ultimate end of man

is the possession of God. As far then as man is concerned, both nature and grace tend to the one ultimate end; nature leading to it by being subordinate to grace. These are elementary principles of theology and even of philosophy. For how could it be otherwise? If you admit the existence of the supernatural order, as a fact, which is as incontrovertible as the existence of the natural order, you must admit the relation of subordination of which we speak. The lower order must be subordinate to the higher, because nature must obey grace; the natural order must be subservient to the supernatural. Hence the state is below the church; the temporal is inferior to the eternal; religion must hold the first place in all things, as it is it that tends most directly to the ultimate end of creation, and it is through religion, that is, through Christ, that all other creatures attain their ultimate end. A system that would put the orders of grace and nature on the

same footing is as absurd as one that would make grace obey nature, or even deny its existence altogether. God would never create two perfectly equal moral forces for the pleasure of witnessing their continual struggle. He has made all things in order, and hence he has made the natural subservient to the supernatural order, just as in Christ, the exemplar of creation, there are two natures; but the human is subservient to the divine, and both are made one in their end by the divine Person who rules both. Any system, therefore, is pagan in principle which separates the state from the church, or makes the temporal equal to spiritual. Autolatria, or sectarianism, is pagan, for the reason that every man is his own God, for he is his own judge of faith.

This spirit of modern paganism extols ancient paganism, its theories and inspirations; and decries Christianity, its arts and sciences, its doctrine and moral code.

Gibbon is one of its incarnations. He has many disciples. They often assert facts that are true, but derive from them conclusions that are false. It is true that, in a mere material point of view, Greece and Rome produced works of art or exercised influence unknown to any Christian nation. Christianity may not have produced a poet like Homer, an orator like Demosthenes, or a sculptor like Phidias. But this proves nothing against Christianity, nor should it cause us to desire a revival of ancient paganism. The end of man is not to write poetry or make statues, and hence the civilization and progress of a people are not to be estimated according to their excellence in literature or sculpture. Religion is the only true civilizer. The index of true progress is the state of morality; the knowledge of God and of moral obligations. True progress does not reject the arts and sciences; but it keeps them in their proper place, it makes them of

secondary importance. Progress is tendency to an end. Human progress is tendency to the end of man, to God, by means of true religion. If this assertion be true, then we can not admire so much the civilization of the ancient Greeks and Romans. They were ignorant of the true religion ; they had false notions of God and of man's destiny. They admitted that the greatest science was the knowledge of self, and they had an aphorism to that effect, *γνωθε σεαυτον*. But what was their self-knowledge ? They were ignorant of the destiny of man's soul ; they doubted its immortality ; they were uncertain of the existence of a future state ; and their greatest philosophers were unable to answer those simple questions regarding God and the soul which the Christian child of eleven summers can now solve with the greatest facility. Arnobius speaks of this ignorance when he says : "Potest quispiam explicare mortaliū id quod Socrates ille explicare

nequit in *Phædone*? homo quid sit? unde sit? in quos usus prolatus sit? cuius sit excogitatus ingenio? quid in mundo faciat? Cur malorum tanta experiatur examina?"* And Lactantius tells us that they only told the truth when they admitted their complete ignorance regarding the most necessary knowledge. "Nunquam illi tam veridici fuerunt quam cum sententiam de sua ignorantia dederunt?"

Div. Ins. III. 2. Pagan excellence is the excellence of matter and sense. Pagan art could form the statue of a nude Venus, but never create the likeness of a chaste Madonna; their excellence was devoid of the true ideal; they were masters in the art of war and in the efforts of imagination, but they fell far below the standard of human dignity, on the score of moral-

* "Can any of them explain what Socrates was unable to explain in *Phædo*? What is man? Whence does he come? For what purpose was he created? What has he to do in the world? Why does he suffer so many ills?"

ity and intellectual truth. Their greatest god was a libertine, as Ovid tells us. "Quam multas matres fecerit ille Deus." Why then laud so much ancient paganism, when its only excellence was material progress? If material ingenuity is to be the measure of greatness, is not man surpassed by the lower animals? He can make no edifice so perfect in architecture as the hive of the bee or the cell of the beaver. He can produce no music equal to the warbling of the canary or the nightingale; even an inanimate machine will surpass him in some respects. The light of the sun in the camera of the photographer will produce the likeness of the human countenance in a few seconds more exactly than all mankind could ever effect. Yet it is for the sake of material progress that many wish to revive ancient paganism. The cause of the success of paganism in the material order is easily accounted for. The pagan mind was imbedded in sense; it knew no-

thing of the life to come, or not enough to make it give special attention to the future state. Its principle was the Epicurean one of Horace, "Carpe diem," enjoy the present :

"Pluck the rosebud while you may !
Old Time is ever flying ;
The bud that blooms for thee to-day,
To-morrow may be dying."

Hence the attention of pagan genius was paid solely to the present life, to matter, to sense, and not to the ideal, spiritual, or supersensible. Hence materialism and paganism are twin sisters. It is no wonder, then, that the pagans succeeded in this world, since all their attention was directed to it. But how deplorable was their moral condition may be seen from the fact that slavery existed everywhere ; and that Aristotle taught that it was both rational and necessary. These, then, were some of the effects of that separation from God which constitutes the essence of paganism whether ancient or modern.

The same effects show themselves now in many countries of the world. The revival of pagan ideas has had many supporters in Europe and America. The theories and theorizers that have been disturbing the good order of society in Europe for many years—socialists, philanthropists, pantheists—are men imbued with pagan ideas. The ideas of Europe before what is called in France the “Renaissance,” were for the most part Christian, but since that period pagan ideas have become prevalent. Too much attention began to be given to mere profane literature. The classics were studied at the expense of the catechism, and gradually men’s thoughts became imbued with the pagan spirit; sound philosophy was neglected; men could not reason clearly because they were not well grounded in the first principles of things. Thus modern paganism came into existence, and it still flourishes. It was the ruling spirit of the first French revolution,

and was impersonated by the “Goddess of Reason.” It has filled Germany and France with false philosophy; we can see its traces in the works of Fichte, Schelling, Cousin, and Jules Simon. It has been working mischief in England for the last two centuries; it has disturbed the peace of Italy—filled that beautiful land with demagogues, radicals, and brigands; it has even laid sacrilegious hands on the crown of the great Pontiff of Christianity. Indeed it seems to us as if modern paganism were impersonated in the spirit of opposition to the temporal power of the Pope; for this opposition is essentially unchristian. It aims at the destruction of civil government, the rights of justice, the law of God and of man. All justice-loving men admit this. The opposers of the temporal power start from the pagan principle of separation of the temporal from the spiritual; they are either bigots or infidels, or vain and frothy theorizers, or corrupt politicians, or Machiavelian

statesmen, or restless demagogues; and if they be Christians, their faith sits as lightly on their conscience as a feather on the back of a whirlwind; they are all pervaded by the pestilential spirit of modern paganism. When a government becomes indifferent in religious matters, wishes to assume supreme control over the asylums of suffering humanity, secularizes churches and schools, caring only for the mere literary or arithmetical education of its subjects; when it makes laws infringing on the rights of conscience or property; when it interferes with the sacraments and the rites of the Church, then it is pagan in spirit. It endeavors to prevent men from attaining the end of creation; it ceases to be a free government, or fulfill the end for which all governments were instituted. Practical applications of these assertions will not fail to present themselves to the mind of the serious reader. It is this spirit of paganism which threatens to overturn all order in

society. In ancient pagan nations, where the poor were comparatively ignorant, and hence did not know their rights, it was easy to hold them in bondage; but now things have changed. Discontent in the lower orders of society can no longer be smothered; education has become general, and, unfortunately, that element, without which it is doubtful whether science be a boon or a curse, has been omitted. Religious education has been separated from secular instruction. Without religion the poor are unable to control their passions or bear their hard lot. They see wealth around them, and without religion they see no reason why it should not be divided among them. Why should they starve while their neighbors roll in splendor and luxury? If the poor were ignorant, they might not observe the disproportion between their condition and that of the aristocracy, nor feel it so keenly. But they are partially educated, they feel their power, and not

having the restraining influence of religion to console them, they use this power. They have done so in Paris; and if they do not always succeed, it is only the bayonet that prevents them. This is one of the dangers of modern paganism, the subversion of stable governments; the effect of unchristian education. It is paganism in education which begets restlessness among the masses, so that "Nemo contentus sorte sua vivat." Those, therefore, who have been so strong in defending the system of pagan education adopted in the state schools of Prussia, England, and our own country, can hardly have reflected on the pernicious tendency of those institutions. Even the reading of the Bible, the great book of Christianity, will not counterbalance the dangerous results of pagan education. Under this system the child learns every thing but the law of God; he unlearns in the society of the school what he had learned from his parents. He may have certain

general ideas of right and wrong, certain vague ideas regarding Christianity and the economy of redemption; but there is nothing solid in his mind, nothing fixed. He does not learn to understand correctly any one dogma of the Christian dispensation. His mind is a religious *vacuum*, or at least there is but a religious mist in his intellect. What does he learn under a pagan system of education that will press down his rising passions? What precept of positive virtue? What principle of self-restraint? What does he learn in a school removed from direct and positive religious influence to make him obedient, honest, chaste, a good citizen and a good Christian? Experience is teaching us every day the dire effects of paganism in education; it begets paganism in religion. Yes, the age is paganizing Christianity. Christianity is a positive religion, with a fixed code of dogmatic truths and moral principles. The religion of Christ, the supreme truth,

could not be a vague and unfinished religion. He taught virtue by facts; He revealed dogmas that should be received as facts; his moral principles are facts; men should receive them. He made the Church their guardian; men should receive truth through the hands of the Church. But the contrary spirit is spreading now. Christianity, if you except its Catholic form, is paganized. From the pulpit preachers hold forth against dogmas and precepts. Religion is said to be every man's private business; there is nothing fixed in it; truth is relative; your Christianity is true and mine is true, and yet we disagree wofully. Religion is made to consist in sympathy or feeling; it is no longer an affair of reason and will, but imagination. It is the poetic sentiment. It is not any longer masculine but feminine. It is not for men, but for spinsters and tender-hearted young ladies. Does not experience teach that this is the character of the

fashionable pulpit eloquence of our country ?

Another proof of the revival of paganism is found in the change of sentiment manifested toward woman. In ancient paganism she was the mere slave of man's appetites. She is so in Mohammedanism; and she is becoming so again. Modern paganism in appearance exalts woman; it makes her even the superior of man; denies that she should be obedient to her husband; opens to her the liberal professions, and allows her to mount the rostrum or the pulpit. But what does this mean? Does it acknowledge woman to be man's spiritual helpmate, or is it not another way to worship sensuality? Free-loveism, communism, and spiritualism are but the expression of modern paganism. It is not through real esteem or respect that woman is now honored so excessively, but from self-love. Men worship their passions in this woman-worship. Ancient paganism

identified human passions in their gods. Jupiter was licentious, and the other divinities followed his good example. Modern paganism is too enlightened to worship the old idols, but it hides the deformity of its nature under the veil of woman-worship. It lives in "Woman's Rights Conventions" and among the disciples of spiritualism. Divorce is common. The sanctity of marriage is despised, and the restrictions of law laughed at. The family tie may be sundered even according to law—law which of its very nature ought to mean limitation and restriction. The Christian may, indeed, lead an evil life, but still his principles are right. There is always hope for his amendment, so long as his faith is unhurt. He yields to passions more from weakness than from malice; he will seldom praise vice, although he himself may be vicious. Though the flesh may rule him, the spirit is willing to acknowledge the truth. But modern

paganism erects vice into the dignity of a principle. He that gives up his Christian faith endeavors to sanction the gratification of his passions by making us believe that virtue which we hold to be vice, and that falsehood which we hold to be truth. There is a great difference between being bad and having bad principles. Few men are as good as their good principles; and few are as bad as the bad principles which they hold. It is principles, good or bad, that influence states and individuals. That state of man is always the worst when, not content with being wicked himself, he endeavors to corrupt others by disseminating immoral principles in society. Hence the first pagans, ignorant as they were, and only thinking of gratifying the passion of the hour, were far less guilty than their enlightened philosophic successors, who in cold blood teach immorality in their works of philosophy, sugar-coating, as it were, the pill to make

its bitterness less sensible. Hence, depraved as were the mobs of the French Revolution—the children of modern paganism, who worshiped the goddess of Reason at *Notre Dame*—far more heinous was the offense of the crowd of philosophers and writers of the last two centuries who preached the deification of nature and sense in their works. Modern paganism, like ancient paganism, is sensual. Hence it denies virginity to be a perfection, and scoffs at celibacy. It denies marriage to be a sacrament, and hence tends to debase woman. Woman under the pagan institutions was merely *MULIER* or *fœmina*; she was far below man. Under Christianity she has been named *mistress* and *lady*. The greatest creature that ever existed was a woman. Christianity teaches this, and hence the dignity of woman is great under the Christian law. Now by raising up woman virtue has been raised up. We must learn to respect woman as Chris-

tians. We can not look upon her as a mere mass of soulless matter, as Mohammedanism teaches ; nor make an idol of her with modern paganism, which makes her an idol to personify sensuality. Nor is the exaggerated respect for woman manifested by unchristian philosophers in our times substantially different from the pagan view of the sex. The partisans of "Woman's Rights" do not defend their theories from the fact that they really believe woman to be the superior or even the equal of man ; but rather because, their principles being founded on sensuality, they deify woman, who is in their eyes the personification of sensual delight. It is the same spirit as that which put the Goddess of Reason on the altar of Notre Dame during the French Revolution. There is a mixture of Christian respect and pagan brutality in this modern apotheosis of woman. And this modern paganism which debases, while it seems to exalt the dignity of woman,

produces the most direful consequences in the family, and in the state as well as in religion. The daughters are trained up in the principles of their parents. Society gives us women without virtue and men who could not esteem it. In religion woman usurps a position that is not hers by any law. She mounts the pulpit, and men of intelligence and standing in society listen to her, daring to speak where good taste and an apostle tell her to be silent. She enters the political arena, and thousands listen to her. The daughters of the land are set an example of effrontery in the women lecturers of the day. The press, which should be one of the guardians of public morality, applauds the disgusting spectacle of woman throwing away her modesty, the only true dignity of her sex. But the press could not be expected to do otherwise, since it too is infected by modern paganism. What is its tone throughout the world at the present time? As a rule,

the great organs of public opinion are unchristian. They are so in Europe as well as in America. They attack religion; preach revolutionism; ignore the laws of eternal justice and truth; care nothing for the observances of Christian politeness; despise charity, and fill the country with scandals, falsehoods, and disgusting items and obscenities to such an extent that no man who cares for the morality of his children can in conscience permit them the promiscuous reading of the newspapers daily published. Nor are the weekly magazines better than the daily journals. You find sickly sentimentality in most of them; enervating tales if not immoral novels. Yet what must the state of society be when we consider the immense multitude that devour daily and weekly the contents of such a licentious press? Is not society thoroughly paganized? Yet we are told that there is much natural morality still left; that the great vices are not com-

mitted ; that persons are more gentlemanly now than ever they were. In a word, natural religion and morality are praised, and persons assert them to be sufficient for the preservation of order and society. Now, as for this natural morality, few will be found so deficient in judgment as to believe in it. Though we know it was an error of the Jansenists to deny the existence of natural virtues, and although but one or two sects admit "the total depravity" system, still in practice and as a matter of fact, we feel that little reliance is to be placed in human nature bereft of God's grace. Man's spiritual nature is very weak. Concupiscence is strong. Let temptations arise, let the occasions present themselves, and how long will natural morality stand the siege ? And though it may stand a longer assault when it has to contend with less violent temptations, it will certainly fall before greater attacks. If we ask ourselves, What is the cause of

modern paganism? the answer must be, self-worship. The tendency to paganize every thing grew strongest from the period when men made themselves each the judge of his religious belief.

The family is the groundwork of civil society; if the family be Christian, the state will be so in like manner; and if the family be corrupt, the state can not remain long untarnished. That which gives sanctity to the family, and consequently strength to civil society, was the Catholic sacrament of marriage; and when the reformers destroyed it, they sowed the seeds of revolution in Europe. Revolution in the family begets revolution in the state. When you allow the separation of man and wife, you allow the right of revolution in the family, and the state must feel the effects of the doctrine. Modern paganism may then be laid at the door of sectarianism, so much alike are all errors, and such is the character of error that it must of necessity engender vice.

The influence of all speculative doctrines is felt in the practical order. Truth begets virtue. The true, the good, and the beautiful are sisters; and so are error, vice, and deformity. They imply each other. Virtue is truth in practice, and beauty in its splendor. Vice is the legitimate offspring of error.

Hence the speculative doctrines of modern paganism have produced and they are producing the most direful results in the moral order. As modern paganism is falsehood, in contradistinction to Christianity, which is truth; so the effects of paganism must be immorality, as the consequence of Christianity must be virtue. Modern paganism, in endeavoring to destroy Christianity, and in changing the principles that govern society, has begotten another excess in regard to love of country. It has given birth to false patriotism, and tends to make men believe that their country is of greater importance than either God or religion.

There is such a thing as true love of country; but it must be Christian in order to be true. The country is not an idol to be worshiped, but a society toward which we have duties and obligations. All obligations centre in one, namely, in that which we have to God, as our Creator and supreme Lord. We have no obligations to our fellow-men only inasmuch as we are bound to them by the law of God. Men are not the property of the state, for there are individual rights as well as state rights. True patriotism is the Christian love of our neighbor. It is founded on the love of family; for the family is the groundwork of civil society. Hence, where there is no true love of family, as in modern pagan legislation, which admits divorce, there can be no true patriotism. The patriot begins by loving his parish and ends by loving his country. He loves his country because he loves his family, his birthplace, and his province. He is

like the Vendean, “Breton en France, et Français à l'étranger.” Politicians, in the modern sense of the word, are not true patriots; they are selfish demagogues actuated by party spirit, not by Christian charity. In Sparta, the children were the property of the state, and the modern system of education tends to a similar result. The true theory of politics, that is to say, the Christian theory, puts every thing in its right place, in regard to the divine order of things. The pagan idea of patriotism does not give us true independence, for it sacrifices the family and individual rights. Christianity defines and limits the rights of the temporal without putting them above the spiritual; it proclaims the liberty of the subject, denounces tyranny, and resists usurpation. For the pagan, the state is all-powerful; for the Christian, its power is subject to reason and a higher law. The true Christian only can say, “Tu solus Dominus, tu solus altissimus,”

thus teaching a lesson of humility to rulers. How far from crouching or servility were our good, stout, yet pious forefathers ! Modern politics, therefore, which make the country an idol, before which every right must be sacrificed, are also pagan. Paganism, in fine, pervades all society, its teachings and its actions. In a word, the spirit of the nineteenth century is thoroughly pagan.

How can this spirit be counteracted ? One great natural means of stemming the torrent of pagan ideas is to oblige men to exact and serious study. A sound, precise course of mental philosophy, in collegiate education, in which right principles regarding law and morality would be inculcated, could do much toward this object. Logic, metaphysics, ethics, and æsthetics should be carefully taught and deeply studied. But this means is not sufficient. It can do something ; it can do much ; but not every thing. However much we may esteem that great science

of reason, which we call philosophy; and however much we may appreciate its utility, we are conscious of its defects. *Philosophy alone, reason alone, can not put pagan ideas out of society.* We must have recourse to a supernatural means. Experience teaches in the present, as in the past, that paganism never yields to any force but that of Christian faith. You may stagger paganism with a syllogism, but you can not kill it without the sign of the Cross.








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